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INTRODUCTION 
 
There are certain questions in the intellectual discourse of a nation that never seem to go 
away. Among the top of this list is certainly the perennial question of “why is there no socialism 
in the United States?” This Question has been asked and answered so many times, that one 
would be hard pressed to find an answer that has not yet been suggested. While countless 
thinkers have pondered the various answers, not enough attention has been paid to the actual act 
of asking. Because, though the Question has been repeated endlessly, it has not remained static. 
The Question has meant different things to different people at different times. Not only have the 
questioners changed, but also so have their reason for asking it, as well as even the Question 
itself.  
The Question’s origins can be traced back to Karl Marx. Marx’s theories differed from 
the prevailing socialist thought of the day. Early socialists, such as Henri de Saint-Simon, Robert 
Owen, and Charles Fourier, held more abstract, distant views of a perfect society, which, while 
egalitarian, were often elitist and based on the premise that revolution would arise without 
struggle through reform measures. Marxian socialism on the other hand was grounded in the 
experiences of the industrial revolution. Society was transformed as the largely agrarian and rural 
populace of Europe made the transition into lowly paid urban factory workers in the new 
industrial cities. This new industrial class became concentrated in large factories and workplaces, 
when it increasingly engaged in collective action through trade unions and strikes.  
While working as a co-editor of a radical leftist newspaper in Paris (1843-1845), Marx 
experienced the waves of worker strikes and uprisings spreading through Europe, which 
convinced him that the transformation of society could only succeed through the participation of 
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the working class. Society was being split into two opposing classes, the property-owning 
bourgeoisie, and the working class, or proletariat, whose only material possession was their 
labor. Marx foresaw the continuing polarization of society leading to a unification of the working 
class through common struggle and their realization of their common class interests (class 
consciousness), which would lead to ever increasing conflict between the classes and the 
inevitable revolution. 
Marx’s theories were also grounded in his study of the British mining and textile 
industries. Setting himself apart from the “utopian socialists” that preceded him (a term he 
applied pejoratively), Marx tried to base his revolutionary theories on what he believed were 
scientific observations of historical development. This application of Marxist science to 
historical development became his theory of “historical materialism.” First elucidated in 1859, it 
stated that all forms of social structures are based on a society’s economic system of production, 
and people’s place in relation to it: 
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, 
which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given 
stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these 
relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, 
on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite 
forms of consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general 
process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.1 
Marx held that the modes of production changed throughout human history and this is what spurs 
revolutionary changes to society: 
                                                 
1
 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), 3. 
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At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into 
conflict with the existing relations of production or… From forms of development of the 
productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social 
revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the 
transformation of the whole immense superstructure.2 
These shifts, he suggested, occur as part of a natural progression of society. The most 
recent one was the shift from feudalism to capitalism. He prophesized that the socialist mode of 
production would emerge in a post-capitalist economic system when the accumulation of capital 
was no longer sustainable due to falling rates of profit and social conflict arising from the 
contradictions between the level of productive technology and the capitalist form of social 
organization. A socialist society would be one where the mode of production was designed to 
directly satisfy human needs, with the working-class cooperatively or publicly owning the means 
of production, which would then lead eventually to the final shift to the classless, stateless ideal 
of communism.  
So for socialists, the transition from capitalism to socialism was natural and inevitable. 
Capitalism simply had matured to the point where it was no longer sustainable. In this theory, the 
further advanced a country was industrially, the more radical and closer to the workers’ 
revolution it should be. As Marx put it “the country that is more developed industrially only 
shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.”3 And this is where the United States 
comes in. Though a late bloomer, by the late nineteenth century the United States was advancing 
industrially at a rapid rate. 
Marx celebrated the history of the United States’ Working Men’s parties of the 1820s and 
1830s as some of the first labor-oriented political organizations in the world. Emanating from of 
                                                 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958), 8-9. 
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the concerns of craftsmen and skilled journeymen over their low social and economic status, the 
members of the Working Men’s parties, or “Workies,” pressed for universal male suffrage, equal 
educational opportunities, protection from debtor imprisonment, greater financial security, and 
shorter working hours.4 Marx and his partner, the German social scientist, political theorist, and 
philosopher Friedrich Engels also admired the Knights of Labor (KOL), the first national labor 
organization in the United States. Organizing along industrial lines, rather than the more 
conservative craft model, the KOL engaged in struggles for the eight-hour workday without 
regard to ethnicity, sex, or skill set in the years following the U.S. Civil War. Engels even went 
as far as to advise the “backwards workers” of Britain to follow their example. The existence of 
these unions was a sure sign of the advanced level of the working class of the United States. 5 
Discussions of the theoretical importance of the United States spread through Marxist 
circles. After the death of Marx and Engels, Karl Kautsky arguably became the world’s leading 
Marxist thinker. Kautsky was an Austrian Marxist and served as the intellectual authority on 
Marxism for the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), an organized socialist party that 
had mass-membership and held representation in it’s nation’s government.6 “America shows us 
our future,” Kautsky stated in 1902: 
In America capitalism is making its greatest progress; it rules there more absolutely and with more 
ruthlessness than anywhere else. The class struggles are sharpening there to the highest possible 
degree.7  
                                                 
4Maximilien Rubel, “Notes on Marx’s Conception of Democracy,” New Politics 1, no 2 (Winter 1962): 83-
85; Lewis Feuer “The North American Origin of Marx's Socialism,” The Western Political Quarterly 16, no. 1 
(Mar., 1963): pp. 53-67  
5
 Frederick Engels, “Preface to the American Edition,” The Condition of the Working Class in England 
(1887),” (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1887/01/26.htm 
6
 Dave Renton, Dissident Marxism: Past Voices for Present Times (New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2004), 60. 
7
 Karl Kautsky, “Socialist Agitation Among Farmers in America,” International Socialist Review, 3 
(September 1902), 148. 
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Eduard Bernstein, SPD leader and later a leading proponent of “Revisionist” Marxism, a 
reform-based Socialism that deviated from traditional Marxist thought, had declared in 1890, 
“we see modern socialism enter and take root in the United States in direct relation to the 
spreading of capitalism and the appearance of the modern proletariat.”8 Going even further, 
August Bebel, one of the founders of the Social Democratic Workers Party of Germany (which 
would merge with German Socialist Workers’ Party to form the SPD), declared confidently in 
1907 that the “Americans will be the first to usher in a Socialist Republic.”9 Bebel’s faith 
continued at least until 1912 when he restated that the United States would “be the first nation to 
declare a co-operative commonwealth.”10 
 Beyond the confines of Marx’s homeland several socialist theoreticians repeated the 
sentiment that the most developed country would lead the world into socialism. Henry Mayer 
Hyndman, a British Marxist and founder of the English Social Democratic Federation and the 
National Socialist Party (a leftist-Marxist party with no relation to Nazism), asserted in 1904, 
“just as North America is to-day the most advanced country economically and socially, so it will 
be the first in which Socialism will find open and legal expression.”11 In 1906, Jean Longuet, the 
French socialist lawyer and grandson of Karl Marx, averred that Marxism was strongest “in the 
new and already vast American socialist movement” than in any other country except Russia.12 
 Daniel De Leon, the combative leader the Socialist Labor Party of America, was ready to 
accept the role assigned to socialists in the United States by historical materialism. De Leon 
                                                 
8
 Eduard Bernstein, “Herr Sartorius von Waltershausen über den modernen Sozialismus in den Vereinigten 
Staaten von Amerika,” Die Neue Zeit, 9, no.1 (1890-91), 73, quoted in R. Laurence Moore, European Socialists and 
the American Promised Land (New York: Oxford University Press 1970), 70. 
9
 August Bebel, “Bebel Sends Greetings,” Appeal to Reason, July 13, 1907 
10
 Nicholas Klein, “The Lion of Germany: An Interview with August Bebel,” The Labour Leader, 
November 14, 1912. 
11
 Henry Hyndman, “A Socialist Survey of the Time,” Justice, April 30, 1904  
12
 Jean Longuet, “A Great Socialist Novel ‘The Jungle,’” La Revue socialiste, 264 (December 1906): 704-
705 
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acknowledged this in 1904 before the Amsterdam Congress of the Socialist International, the 
second incarnation of the global alliance of socialist and labor parties. "Taking into consideration 
only certain cardinal principles [of Marxism],” stated De Leon, “the conclusion cannot be 
escaped that America is the theatre where the crest of capitalism would first be shorn by the 
falchion of socialism." A short while later, De Leon proclaimed to the 1906 convention of the 
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), the radical industrial trade union based in part on his 
philosophy of Marxism mixed with syndicalism that, "If my reading of history is correct, the 
prophecy of Marx will be fulfilled and America will ring the downfall of capitalism the world 
over."13 
 However, Marx had been mistaken about the degree of radicalism in the United States.  
The Working Men’s parties were not socialists, but rather advocated for a meritocracy in 
capitalism. Their scope and view remained restricted to local issues, and their organization 
would be short lived. The Knights of Labor were not socialists either, but promoted a producer 
ethic of republicanism. The KOL peaked in 1886, and they too declined due to the problems of 
an autocratic structure, mismanagement, and unsuccessful strikes. They also suffered when a 
labor protest rally near Chicago’s Haymarket Square turned into a riot after someone threw a 
bomb at police and eight anarchists were prosecuted for their alleged complicity in the attack. 
The KOL’s reputation was forever tarnished by anarchy and violence as the more conservative 
craft union federation, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) quickly supplanted it at the 
center of labor in the United States. 
 For those whose understanding of historical materialism led them to conclude that the 
United States should be the first to usher in worldwide revolution, the socialist movement faced a 
                                                 
13
 Daniel De Leon, Proceedings of the Industrial Workers of the World (Chicago, 1906), 608; Daniel De 
Leon, Flashlights of the Amsterdam Congress (New York: New York Labor News Co., 1904), 133. 
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crisis. That the United States failed to meet its responsibilities called into question the validity of 
their interpretation of socialism. And so began fascination with the question “why is there no 
socialism in the United States?”  The Question was originally an attempt by radicals to reconcile 
their philosophy with reality, the query long outlasted its original impetus. It has passed from 
generation to generation and as each new group takes up its mantle, they have come up with a 
diversity of answers. Some involved groundbreaking concepts to explain the absence U.S. 
socialism while others recycled responses that came long before. But all are novel in the sense 
that they reflect the contemporary society of those who pose it. The inquiry into “Why is there no 
socialism in the United States?” has been tailored to meet the specific the interests and needs of 
each generation. The variety of answers to the Question reflects the experience of each 
generation and its relation to broader forces in society, and the history of the United States.  
 
 
PART ONE: Roast Beef and Apple Pie 
Radicals and Reformers in an Irreconcilable Reality, 1900s-1940s 
 
In the first half of the twentieth century the query “Why is there no socialism in the 
United States?” was initially asked by radicals and early Socialist parties trying to resolve 
practice and theory. Yet scholars sympathetic to Progressive reforms to regulate big business, 
protect labor and initiate campaigns against corruption in the early years of the century in the 
United States also sought to understand the absence of socialism, even if only to prevent it. By 
the 1920s and 1930s, in contrast, the Communist Party sought to better understand it so they 
could remedy the situation. The answers, in both cases, were generally confined to economic, 
political and social factors. However, the Question was not an abstract exercise. Rather it held 
real-world importance to thousands who sought either to preserve or change the society in which 
they lived.  
 
I. 
 
 That U.S. capitalism continued to grow, but not U.S. socialism posed a problem to 
Marxist theorists who assumed the cultural and political superstructure of a society should reflect 
its economic and technological structure. And so it was the Marxists themselves that were first to 
address the Question of the absence of socialism in the United States. Marx and Engels proposed 
a number of potential factors that explained why the United States was lagging. For example, 
Marx and Engels accused U.S. socialists of being extreme and uncompromising in their 
adherence to Marxist doctrines. Marx referred to socialists in the United States as “crotchety and 
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sectarian,” while Engels in 1886 criticized the Socialist Labor Party (SLP), the first major U.S. 
socialist party, for treating Marxism in a “doctrinaire and dogmatic way as something which has 
got to be learnt by heart and which will then supply all needs without more ado. To them it is a 
credo and not a guide to action.”14 Simultaneously, however, Marx and Engels also claimed that 
U.S. citizens and other English-speaking people were unable to grasp complex concepts. Engels 
asserted in 1887 that Marx and his’ works were “far too difficult for America at the present time. 
The workers over there… are still crude, tremendously backward theoretically, in particular, as a 
result of their general Anglo-Saxon and special American nature.”15 
 Marx and Engels also pointed to the diversity of the United States as an impediment to 
radicalism. Ethnic and racial cleavages, according to them, were intentionally created to create 
an obstacle to the workers’ movement. In a letter to the German-American Socialist Hermann 
Schlüter in 1892, Engels wrote: 
Your great obstacle in America, it seems to me, lies in the exceptional position of the 
native workers… Now a working class has developed and has also to a great extent 
organized itself on trade union lines. But it still takes up an aristocratic attitude and 
wherever possible leaves the ordinary badly paid occupations to the immigrants, of whom 
only a small section enter the aristocratic trade unions. But these immigrants are divided 
into different nationalities and understand neither one another nor, for the most part the 
language of the country. And your bourgeoisie knows much better even than the Austrian 
Government how to play off one nationality against each other: Jew, Italians, Bohemians, 
                                                 
14
 Engels to Sorge, February 8, 1890, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Correspondence, 1846-
1895, trans. Dona Torr (New York: International Publishers, 1942),449-450. 
15
 Engels to Sorge, March 10, 1887, Letters to Americans, Marx and Engels (New York: International 
Publishers Co., 1953),177. 
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etc., against Germans and Irish and each other, so that differences in the standard of life 
of different workers exist, I believe in New York to an extent unheard of elsewhere.16 
There were also political factors that impeded the emergence of a socialist party in the United 
States. The “The Constitution,” Engels wrote in 1893, “causes every vote for any candidate not 
put up by one of the two governing parties to appear lost. And the American… wants to 
influence his state; he does not throw his vote away.”17  
 A final consideration proposed by Marx and Engels was the fact that the United States 
was a “new nation.” Because it was founded as a result of settler colonialism in the seventeenth 
through eighteenth centuries, it lacked many of the entrenched institutions and traditions of 
Europe. Marx and Engels concluded this boded ill for the nascent republic. People of the United 
States were “born conservative,” Engels explained in 1890, “just because America is so purely 
bourgeois, so entirely without a feudal past and therefore proud of its purely bourgeois 
organization.”18 And again in 1892:  
It is… quite natural quite natural, that in such a young country, which has never known 
feudalism and has grown up on a bourgeois basis from the first, bourgeois prejudices 
should also be so strongly rooted in the working class. 19 
This sociological explanation, as well as variations of its political, cultural, ethnic, and internal 
answers, would repeat in some variety throughout all incarnations of this debate. Yet Engels and 
Marx clung to the importance of economic factors, with Engels claiming in 1886 “even in 
America the condition of the working class must gradually sink lower and lower.” Because of the 
                                                 
16
 Engels to Schlüter, March 30, 1892 Selected Correspondence, 496-497. 
17
 Engels to Sorge December 2, 1893, “Unpublished Letters of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels to 
Americans,” trans/ed. Leonard E. Mins Science and Society 2 (Spring 1938): 374. 
18
 Engels to Sorge, February 8, 1890, Selected Correspondence, 467.  
19
 Engels to Sorge, December 31, 1892, Selected Correspondence, 501. 
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peculiarities of the U.S. situation, he added, “theory counts for nothing until it is imposed by dire 
necessity.”20 
 
II. 
 
 Early twentieth-century discussions of the prospect of socialism in the United States 
centered around one of the most important scholarly analyses of this time “Warum gibt es in den 
Vereinigten Staaten keinen Sozialismus? (1906),” (Why is there No Socialism in the United 
States?), a question posed by German economist and sociologist Werner Sombart. Sombart later 
aligned himself with Nazism, but at the time of this essay, he was one of the first pro-socialist 
professors in Imperial Germany acknowledging the absence of socialism in the United States. 
His prognosis for the country’s future was cautiously optimistic. He assumed that class conflict 
would eventually increase in the United States and with it would come the arrival of socialist 
movement.21  
Before it did, however, Sombart believed U.S. socialists faced an uphill battle. This was 
because the working class of the United States was much more conservative than his European 
counterparts, especially German workers. The cause of the workers’ conservatism was 
affluence.22 As Sombart famously, declared “all socialist Utopias came to nothing on reefs of 
roast beef and apple pie.”23 Simply put, workers in the United States had significantly higher 
                                                 
20
 Engels to Florence Kelley Wischnewetsky, February 3, 1886, Letters to Americans, 149-150; Engels to 
Florence Kelley Wischnewetsky, August 13, 1886, Letters to Americans, 160. 
 
21
 Iring Fetscher, “Comment 2 on American Capitalism’s Economic Rewards (1974),” in Failure of a 
Dream: Essays in the History of American Socialism, 2nd ed., eds. John H.M. Laslett and Seymour Martin Lipset 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 477. 
22
 Jerome Karabel, “The Failure of American Socialism Reconsidered,” Socialist Register, 16 (1979), 208. 
23
 Werner Sombart, Why is There No Socialism in the United States?, trans. Patricia M. Hocking and C.T. 
Husbands (London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1976), 105-106. 
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incomes and standards of living than German workers. “The diet of the American worker is 
much closer to that of [the] better-off [German] middle-class circles than to that of [the German] 
class of wage laborers,” Sombart concluded.24 He reiterated that radicalism arises from economic 
depredation. It is only when a group is sufficiently convinced that the present system holds no 
likelihood of improvement that they will risk all that they have in attempting to overthrow it, he 
argued. Conversely, if workers were content with their economic level they would not have the 
desire to rebel and attempts to form a class-based political movement would fall on deaf ears.  
Beyond simply attributing the rejection of radicalism to the high level of affluence, 
Sombart portrayed a high level of social equality in the United States. The relationship between 
labor and management, he contended, was not as adversarial as in Europe, and even the temper 
of conversation between employee and employer had a much more respectful tone.25 Along with 
social equality, came social mobility. The workers in the United States, Sombart concluded, had 
a much better chance of climbing into a higher class than in Europe. If the working class 
assumed that they stood a good chance of escaping the bottom rung of the economic ladder, then 
they would be less inclined to change the system, and would put their efforts towards economic 
endeavors rather than political.  
Social mobility was part and parcel of geographic mobility. The abundance of land acted 
as a safety valve for social tensions, Sombart explained. Geographic mobility offered workers an 
“avenue of escape.” No matter how bad life was the working class always had the option (or at 
least the belief in the option) to pack up and move to the unsettled west. Instead of working 
                                                 
24
 Ibid., 105. 
25
 Ibid., 18-20. 
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toward the reorganization of the capitalist system, Sombart thought that workers would simply 
start life anew.26  
 
III. 
  
Despite all the obstacles that the working class in the United States faced, Sombart still 
predicted socialism’s inevitable success when he declared it “…will in all likelihood come to 
fullest bloom in the new world.”27 Sombart’s optimistic thesis went against standard Marxist 
theory in that it proposed that as capitalism advanced, the conditions of workers would inevitably 
deteriorate. Though the United States had the most developed capitalism, it appeared able to 
continue to provide workers with an ever-increasing standard of living. This analysis came out of 
an emerging debate in the European radical intellectual scene.  
In one camp there were socialists who were less concerned with the exact predictions of 
Marx and willing to alter or abandon central tenets of Marist philosophy, and so were more 
willing to accept Sombart’s unappealing prognosis that capitalism was serving workers in the 
United States well. Emile Vandervelde, the Belgian socialist, conceded in 1904 that in terms of 
economic welfare, “no one seriously disputes that, all in all, American workers have a position 
very superior to that of the European worker.”28 J. Keir Hardie, the Scottish socialist and British 
Labour leader, repeated the belief in 1908 that “[U.S.] capitalism has a power of adaptability for 
which some of its Socialist opponents do not make sufficient allowance.”29 The German Social 
Democrat Ludwig Quessel cited statistical evidence in 1909 that showed the wage increases that 
                                                 
26
 Ibid., 20. 
27
 Ibid.,141-142. 
28
 Emile Vandervelde, “Impressions of America,” La Revue socialiste, 41 (March 1905): 287. 
29
 J. Keir Hardie, “James Keir Hardie, M.P. Character Sketch,” The Labour Leader, September 5, 1903. 
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provided U.S. workers with an almost “bourgeois standard of living” showed no signs of slowing 
down.30 H.G. Wells, the famous English author of the novels The Time Machine (1895), The War 
of the Worlds (1897), and The Invisible Man (1897), and member of the Fabian Society, a British 
organization that advocated the advance of socialism principles through gradual reforms, 
observed that in the United States, though “a growing proportion of wealth of the community is 
passing into the hands of a small minority,” the growing income gap was disguised by “the 
enormous increase of the total wealth.”31 
 In the other camp were socialist thinkers who held a deeper commitment to the precise 
nature of Marxist concepts, and rejected Sombart’s analysis. Though U.S. socialist journalist and 
editor of the International Soczalst Revzew, Algie Martin Simons, had translated and printed the 
first half of Sombart’s essay in his publication, he ceased publishing the second half in 1907 after 
he grew offended with the conclusion that U.S. capitalism defied Marxist philosophy and 
denounced the “nonsense on the conditions of American workers.”32  
Socialists seeking answers that explained the situation in the United States without 
calling into question the soundness of Marist theory, like Morris Hillquit, founder and leader of 
the Socialist Party of America and future Socialist candidate for mayor of New York City, 
formulated explanations for the stunted growth of U.S. socialism that were in disagreement with 
Sombart’s. Rejecting the reformism of much of the Sombart camp, Hillquit, was convinced that 
revolution could not come through the existing political system and asserted that the unique state 
of politics in the United States was to blame for the lack of an organized working-class party. He 
contended that the U.S. electoral system was designed to limit the chances of a third party by 
                                                 
30
 Ludwig Quessel, “K. Kautsky als Vulgärökonom,” Sozialistische Monatshefte, 15, no. 2 (1909): 1105. 
31
 H.G. Wells, The Future in America: A Search after Realities, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1906), 
105-106. 
32
 Karabel, “The Failure of American Socialism Reconsidered,” 206. 
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absorbing radicals into one of the two major coalition parties. Hillquit blamed the failure of the 
Socialist party in the 1908 elections on the Democratic party which 
revived all the slogans of its old time middle-class radicalism and re-instated the prophet 
of that brand of radicalism, William J. Bryan, in the leadership of the party… The direct 
and public endorsement of the Democratic Party by the officials of the American 
Federation of Labor and their appeal to organized labor for active support of the 
candidates of that party, could not but be detrimental to the socialist campaign.33 
Hillquit’s view is borne out by the fact that as early as the 1820s, Jeffersonian Democrats 
had coopted Working Men’s Parties.34 In 1872 the Democratic Party undercut radicals by 
supporting Horace Greeley, a social reformer and member of the early utopian socialist 
Fourierist movement, for president instead of David Davis, sitting Supreme Court Justice and 
candidate of the Labor Reform Party, a short lived, political vehicle for the National Labor 
Union, the first nationwide labor union in the United States.  
Another example of the weakness of third political parties involved the neutralization of 
the People’s Party, the largest and most sustained effort at a third party in the United States. Also 
known as the “Populists,” the short-lived U.S. political movement was a loose coalition of 
Farmers alliances and laborers united against eastern bankers, industrialists, railroad companies, 
and elites in general. In the last decade of the 19th century, these agrarian radicals advocated for 
an expanded currency, free coinage of gold and silver, public ownership of railroads, and a 
graduated federal income tax. The movement grew fast and even gained the support of labor, 
small business, and socialists, although it was co-opted when the Democratic Party adopted 
many of its reform planks. When the Democrats ran agrarian reformer William Jennings Bryan 
                                                 
33
 Morris Hillquit, History of Socialism in the United States, (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1910), 
349. 
34
 Yohoshua Arieli, Individualism and Nationalism in American Ideology, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1964),238-239. 
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as their presidential candidate in 1896, the Populists endorsed him, in effect fusing the parties 
together.35 This trend was so ominous that the German intellectual Philipp Rappaport, writing in 
the socialist journal of the SPD Die Neue Zeit in 1907, argued that socialists in the United States 
should focus on converting the Democratic party, because attempting to work around it in a third 
party was hopeless.36 
Other socialists looking to explain away the incongruity of socialism in the United States 
turned to the unique characteristics of the U.S. working class itself. Franz Mehring, a German 
socialist and historian, claimed that because the United States was “still an overwhelmingly 
agricultural country,” class consciousness had not fully developed. 37 Another difference 
attributed to the U.S. Socialists was their ideology. Rather than lacking revolutionary fervor, 
however, some like H.G. Wells accused it of having too much. Wells contended that Socialism 
of the United States was “a fierce form of socialist teaching… far more closely akin to the 
revolutionary socialism of the continent than to the constructive and evolutionary socialism of 
Great Britain… It is a Socialism reeking with class feeling and class hatred and altogether 
anarchistic in spirit…”38 It was this radical form of socialism that prevented Socialists in the 
United States from making the proper concessions these analysts believed were necessary to 
enact real gains. Echoing Marx and Engels’ criticisms of the U.S. Party, Vladimir Lenin, the 
Russian socialist thinker and future leader of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the Soviet 
Union, made his point in 1907:  
What Marx and Engels criticize in British and American socialism is its isolation from 
the labour movements. The burden of all their numerous comments on… the American 
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Socialists is the accusation that they have reduced Marxism to a dogma, to a ‘rigid 
orthodoxy’… that they are incapable of adapting themselves to the theoretically helpless 
but living and powerful mass labour movement that is marching alongside them.”39  
Without being able to make concessions, this argument suggested, the Socialists could not 
mobilize workers in the United States, and Socialism stood no chance. 
Karl Kautsky also furthered the idea that the make-up of the U.S. working class was to 
blame. Kautsky contended that the absence of a native working class, caused by ever-increasing 
waves of immigration, prevented a working class movement from forming.40 Kautsky also 
highlighted The United States’ specific historical development. The United States, unlike 
Europe, had no direct feudal past. Much of the class consciousness and political organization of 
the European socialist organizations stemmed from the fight for basic political rights. However, 
in the United States basic political rights were already guaranteed to much of the public. As 
Kautsky put it, “the struggle for freedom is very much superior to the effortless possession of a 
freedom that others have won before.”41 
The lack of a large-scale struggle for political rights in the United States was a popular 
explanation for the United States’ unique situation. Writing in 1907, Vladimir Lenin pointed to 
“the absence of any at all big, nation-wide democratic tasks facing the proletariat” as the reason 
for failure of socialism in the United States. Lenin added that the basic political liberties in the 
United States actually produced “the complete subjection of the proletariat to bourgeois politics; 
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the sectarian isolation of the [socialist] groups… not the slightest success of the Socialists among 
the working masses in the elections, etc.”42  
Morris Hillquit agreed with Lenin that the success of the United States in political 
freedoms actually undermined the Socialists ability to garner support: 
Another check to the progress of the socialist movement in the United States was to be 
found in the political institutions of the country: the working classes of the European 
countries were as a rule, deprived of some political rights enjoyed by other classes of 
citizens, and the common struggle for the acquisition of those rights was frequently the 
first cause to draw them together in a political union. 
In the United States, however, the working men enjoyed full political equality at all 
times, and thus had one less motive to organize politically on a class basis.43 
Following Hillquit’s line of reasoning, Max Beer, the Austrian-born Marxist journalist, 
focused on the lack of middle-class political movements as the saboteur of U.S. socialism. In 
Marxist theory, according to Beer, the bourgeoisie would struggle for political rights by 
mobilizing the proletariat: 
The rise and effervescence of Socialist Labour movements at various periods were, as a 
rule, the concomitant phenomena of middle-class upheavals, which, directly or indirectly 
mobilized some strata of the working class…[and which] were accompanied by an inrush 
of Socialists ideas… [However] in the United States middle class movements against a 
privileged upper class or personal monarchy could not arise, for these phenomena did not 
exist, and there was no need to mobilize the classes for the fight.44 
Without being mobilized by the middle class in their struggle for political rights, wrote 
Beer, the working class in the United States never gained the political acumen and consciousness 
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necessary to take it one step further and advocate on behalf of their own class. Variations on 
these explanations would soon become increasingly useful, as the potential for a socialist 
movement in the United States became even more in doubt.  
 
IV. 
 
It was not only radicals who addressed the absence of U.S. socialism. Political reformers 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century became increasingly interested in the 
problems brought up by industrialization and modernization, however, “Progressives” sought to 
address the most egregious abuses of capitalism in order to save the system from more radical 
changes. This period of social activism saw urban, middle-class reformers support a greater role 
of the government regarding, political corruption, regulation of big business, labor rights, and 
social welfare, including involvement in enacting the direct primary, initiative, referendum, 
recall, women’s suffrage. Progressive Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and 
Woodrow Wilson pursued anti-trust action, established the Federal Reserve System (1913), 
which set up the central banking system in the Unites States, and witnessed passage of the 
Seventeenth Amendment (1913), which provided the direct election of U.S. senators.45  
Progressive concepts also spilled over into academia. In what would become known as 
the “Progressive School,” historians shifted away from the Germanic style of “scientific” history, 
and the rigorous analysis of primary documents to extract larger historical truths.46 Drawing from 
their contemporary experiences, progressive scholars such as Frederick Jackson Turner, Charles 
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A. Beard, and Vernon L. Parrington used economic criteria to evaluate the past and saw conflict 
as a major driving force throughout U.S. history.  
Turner’s 1893 essay, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” presented 
to the American Historical Association, argued that in its political and socioeconomic effects, 
three centuries of westward movement of population across the continent provided a 
democratizing experience that was uniquely “American.” This concept, known as the frontier 
thesis, was identical to Sombart’s emphasis on geographic mobility, except instead of lamenting 
the class impediment, Turner fear the closing of the frontier: "A new national development is 
before us without the former safety valve of abundant resources open to him who would take. 
Classes are becoming alarmingly distinct."47 
 Beard embraced the concept of class struggle, but mainly in terms of farmers and 
middle-class producers versus financial elites, not the industrial working class, in works such as 
An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (1913) and The Rise of American Civilization 
(1927) that argued that such conflict was defining the featuring of U.S. history. Parrington’s 
Main Currents in American Thought (1927–1930), in turn, focused on U.S. literary and 
intellectual history by proposing a sharp divide between elitist Hamiltonian currents and the 
populist Jeffersonian forces.   
Progressive approaches characterized U.S. history as a struggle between the people 
versus the elites. This, however, was not a Marxist concept of class struggle. Turner, Beard, and 
Parrington saw private property and free enterprise as the best way to ensure there were 
opportunities for ordinary citizens of the United States, and thus private property should be 
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protected. Instead of celebrating the past, however, progressive scholars looked for lessons to 
move forward and justify reforms to save capitalism. 
The most important academic analysis of the Question in the Progressive era came from 
Selig Perlman, a scholar in the academic school of industrial labor economics and history that 
took root at the University of Wisconsin.48 Perlman was born in Congress Poland (a part of 
Tsarist Russia), to parents active in the Zionist and labor movement. After immigrating to the 
United States in 1918, he attended the University of Wisconsin at Madison, where he studied 
under Frederick Jackson Turner and the progressive labor historian and economist John R. 
Commons, with whom he would work for years to come. Under their influences, Perlman 
abandoned an earlier dedication to Marxism in favor of a Progressive approach to the study of 
labor.  
In works such as The History of Labor in the United States (written with Commons, 10 
vols., 1918) and A Theory of the Labor Movement (1928), Perlman questioned the argument 
proposed by Lenin and others that criticized unions for too often pursuing higher wages and 
better working conditions (the so-called “bread-and-butter” issues), rather than putting their 
efforts towards revolution. Lenin had suggested in his extremely influential political pamphlet of 
1902, “What Is to Be Done?” that it is the role of intellectuals and professional revolutionaries to 
enter the labor movement and guide it along.49 Perlman agreed with Lenin yet he claimed that 
the working class was inherently conservative and that radicalism only arose from the agitation 
of intellectuals imposing their own anti-capitalist beliefs upon them.50  
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Unlike Lenin, Perlman proposed that the conservative nature of the working class was a 
positive thing.51 Unions formed, Perlman argued, as a means for workers to maintain high wages. 
It was correct, not an aberration, for unions to focus solely on wages and working conditions, he 
wrote. In this "business unionism" model of labor, members defined the goals of the union.52  
These conservative features of the proletariat particularly held true for U.S. workers Perlman 
concluded. It was for this reason there was no socialism in the United States.  
The causes of conservatism among U.S. workers ran the gamut, according to Perlman. 
Partially, it was due to the particular nature of the U.S. national character. Being rooted in 
puritanism with its emphasis on individualism, he wrote, the ethos of workers in the United 
States was not compatible with the social collectivism needed for socialism. Perlman also 
suggested that worker conservatism had to do with the racial and ethnic makeup of the United 
States. Not only did ethnic heterogeneity prevent deep class affiliations from forming, but the 
waves of immigrants had made it so there was not a “settled” wage earning class to organize.53 
Perlman suggested that these immigrants and their offspring were conservative by nature, 
primarily focused on improving their inferior lot, therefore working to support, rather than 
challenge the capitalist system. 54 
 Revealing his affinity with Progressives, Perlman put economic reasons at the forefront 
of the reasons why the United State was unsuitable for socialism. Agreeing with Sombart and 
many socialist commentators, he saw the U.S. class structure as much more fluid than in Europe. 
This fluidity offered “the opportunity for the exceptional workman to desert his class and set up 
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in business for himself.”55 If workers in the United States could reasonably hope to escape the 
confines of their class, the argument went, they would not go to great lengths to try to change it.  
 According to Perlman, this egalitarian class system produced a unique political system in 
the United States, which was the most important feature in inhibiting the growth of radicalism.  
Agreeing with the likes of Kautsky, Lenin and Hillquit, Perlman pointed out that universal 
manhood suffrage was attained in the United States without much struggle. This “free gift of the 
ballot” as he would come to call it,  
…came to labor at an early date as a by product of the Jeffersonian democratic 
movement. In other countries, where the labor movement started while the workingmen 
were still denied the franchise, there was in the last analysis no need of a theory of 
“surplus value” to convince them that they were a class apart and should therefore be 
‘class conscious.’ There ran a line like a red thread between the laboring class and the 
other classes. Not so where that line is only an economic one.56 
 Perlman contended that, unlike other working class political movements like the Chartists 
in England, the U.S. working class had primarily economic demands.57 Without a political 
component to the movement, workers in the United States never became politically active and 
were content to settle their grievances through unions and strikes rather than developing a labor 
based political organization. For Perlman, it was this focus on economic issues that led to the 
development of “business unionism” and the anti-political, job-consciousness approach of U.S. 
labor. Perlman’s view not only coincided with the Progressive scholarly focus on economics, but 
also served the Progressive agenda by highlighting the overall conservatism of the working class 
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in the United States as well as focusing on the potential of the United States political system to 
both implement and prevent social change.  
 
V. 
 
The outlook for the United States’ conversion to socialism diminished even further as 
events surrounding World War I stunted the hope of radical political action. At home the United 
States resorted to repression to silence dissent through measures such as the Espionage Act of 
1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918, which made it a crime to write, publish or even talk about the 
armed forces in a negative way and allowed the government to prosecute scores of radicals. And 
following the War, the persecution continued as radicals were denied political rights, subject to 
exclusionary laws, arrested, and even killed. The First Red Scare (1919-1921) was spurred in 
large part by one of the most lasting outcomes of the WWI, the Russian Revolution of 1917.  
The Russian Revolution enabled a Marxist party to assume the reigns of power of a 
nation for the first time in history. This would have profound effects on radicalism the world 
over, including the United States. The revolutionary Bolsheviks taking the title of the 
Communist Party, assumed the mantle of the leaders of the worldwide workers’ movement 
following the creation of the Soviet Union. Through the creation of the Third, or Communist 
International (Comintern), they tried to refashion the world’s Marxist parties in their image. In 
the United States the left wing of the Socialist party split off in 1919 to form the Communist 
Party of America, joining with the Communist Labor Party to form the Communist Party USA 
(CPUSA) in 1920. Only months after its founding, the CPUSA had 60,000 members, while the 
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Socialist party had only 40,000.58 This would not only help cripple the American Socialist party 
by producing deep fractures within it but would incite further repression from government 
authorities, thereby changing the entire nature of the debate surrounding socialism in the United 
States.  
It was now clear that the United States would not be the first country to usher in 
socialism and the Communists were faced with the task of explaining why. This was 
theoretically important as a means to reconcile Marxist theory that socialism would first appear 
in the country that was most advanced industrially with the fact that it actually began in the 
primarily agrarian and industrially weak state of Russia. In addition, this was a practical 
problem. Since the goal of the Comintern, initially, was to spread revolution worldwide, it 
needed to be determined what approaches, if any, should be taken in the United States. 
Communists needed to understand why there was no socialism in the United States. To resolve 
this contradiction Communist thinkers like Grigory Zinoviev, the Bolshevik revolutionary and 
leader of the Comintern, claimed there was something about the United States that made it 
different from the rest of the countries. Instead of the more advanced capitalist countries 
collapsing first, the United States was affluent enough to stave off the inevitable deterioration of 
capitalism longer than most, at least temporarily.59   
This theory was expounded in 1926 when Zinoviev first declared that instead of the 
anticipated decline, U.S. Capitalism was “on the upgrade.”60 Hungarian Communist and 
Comintern functionary for the CPUSA, John Pepper, incorporated this line of reasoning into his 
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address to the Ninth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in 1928. 
Pepper identified it as number one out of his five “fundamental differences” between the United 
States and the Europe: 
1. American capitalism is still on the upgrade as compared with European capitalism. 2. 
American imperialism is still increasing in power on almost every front of world 
politics… 3. The American working class as a whole is in a privileged position compared 
with the European working class… 4. …The working class of America has not yet 
reached that stage of class-consciousness and homogeneity which is the prerequisite of 
constituting itself as an independent political factor. 5. There is no marked tendency of a 
left trend on a national scale in the American working class.61  
This explanation provided the Communists a way to explain away the peculiarity that was the 
United States. They accepted that U.S. capitalism would decay and with it would come the 
inevitable proletariat revolution. They only sought to update Marxist theory in light of the 
unimaginable success of United States industry, and adjust their expectations, and tactics, for the 
U.S. branch of the Communist Party accordingly. As Jay Lovenstone, then general secretary of 
the CPUSA, put it blankly, “objective conditions prevailing in the United States are not favorable 
for the development of a mass Communist Party.”62 
However, Joseph Stalin, the Bolshevik revolutionary who by the late 1920s had assumed 
undisputed control of the Soviet Union and Comintern, rejected this defeatism. Stalin chastised 
the U.S. Party for believing in what he coined as “American exceptionalism” by inflating the 
distinctiveness of U.S. capitalism. Instead, Stalin declared that the collapse of worldwide 
capitalism was nigh, and returned the United States as the theoretical harbinger of socialist 
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success. At a speech to the American Commission of the Comintern in 1929 he expounded the 
new position: 
The Communist Party of America is one of the few communist parties in the world upon 
which history has placed tasks of decisive importance from the point of the international 
revolutionary movement… Many seen to think that the general crisis of capitalism will 
not affect America. This, of course, is wrong… I think that the moment is not far off 
when a revolutionary crisis comes in the United States, it will mark the beginning of the 
end of world capitalism.63 
 While admitting that the United States, like any other country, had “special peculiarities,” 
Stalin warned that it was “incorrect to base the activities of the Communist Party on these 
specific features, since… the general features of capitalism… are the same in all countries.”64 
Stalin had restored the significance of the United States in Marxist theory while simultaneously 
ending its remarkableness. 
 At the same time, not all socialists followed the Communist party line. Bolshevik 
revolutionary and soon-to-be-exiled Soviet leader Leon Trotsky saw U.S. capitalism as not yet 
“having exhausted itself,” and “incomparably stronger and more solid than European 
capitalism.”65 According to Trotsky, the retarded development of class consciousness in the 
United States was due to immense economic power, which allowed it “to apply the traditional 
method of the British bourgeoisie to fatten the labor aristocracy in order to keep the workers in 
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shackles.”66 As long as U.S. capitalism was growing, it could provide enough workers with 
enough benefits to prevent the growth of socialism.    
 Leon Samson, a radical U.S. socialist, instead connected the absence of socialism to 
values in the United States. Samson claimed that instead of Marxism, “Americanism” was the 
dominant ideology among U.S. workers, and with its creed of egalitarianism, Americanism 
prevented socialism by making many in the United States believe that they already possessed 
what socialism offered:  
When we examine the meaning of Americanism, we discover that Americanism is to the 
American not a tradition or a territory, not what France is to a Frenchman or England to 
an Englishman, but a doctrine—what socialism is to a socialist. Like socialism, 
Americanism is looked upon ... as a highly attenuated, conceptualized, platonic, 
impersonal attraction toward a system of ideas, a solemn assent to a handful of final 
notions—democracy, liberty, opportunity, to all of which the American adheres 
rationalistically much as a socialist adheres to his socialism—because it does him good, 
because it gives him work, because, so he thinks, it guarantees him happiness. 
Americanism has thus served as a substitute for socialism. 67  
In the 1930s by the CPUSA under the leadership of Earl Browder tried to exploit this connection 
between Americanism and socialism. Under the slogan “Communism is 20th Century 
Americanism” Browder tried to gain the party mainstream acceptance by portraying 
Communism as an indigenous reform movement during the period of cooperation known as the 
Popular Front (1935-1939).68 The CPUSA joined with Communist parties around the world in 
making alliances with liberal and leftist groups in order to defend the world from the growing 
                                                 
66
 Ibid., 59. 
67
 Leon Samson, Toward a United Front: A Philosophy For American Workers (New York: Farrar and 
Rinehart, 1935), 16-17. 
68
 Maurice Isserman, Which Side Were You On?: The American Communist Party During the Second 
World War. (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1982),9. 
29
 
fascist threat as well as to take advantage of the weakened state of capitalism during the Great 
Depression to make social advances. 
The Communist party in the 1930s experienced unprecedented approval in the United 
States. CPUSA membership swelled to over 65,000 as it organized the unemployed, created 
"red" unions, and fought evictions of farmers and the working poor.69 The Party also championed 
the rights of African Americans by offering aid and organization to poor black sharecroppers and 
tenant farmers, as well as legal representation to the high-profile Alabama “Scottsboro Boys” 
case, where it succeeded in freeing eight, young black men, wrongly sentenced to death.70 
Politically, the Communist Party gained legitimacy when it aligned itself with President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and his administration’s “New Deal” reform (1933-1938), which sought to 
save the capitalist system and prevent more radical forces from taking action with measures that 
restructured the nation’s financial system, created employment through public work programs, 
slowed farm and home foreclosure rates, and provided basic relief for the suffering public. This 
was accompanied by the inclusion of Communists and radicals into the nation’s cultural sphere. 
Michael Denning, American Studies Scholar, has termed it the “Cultural Front,” “the brief 
moment when ‘politics’ captured the arts, when writers went left, Hollywood turned Red, and 
painters, musicians, and photographers were ‘social-minded.’”71 Radicalism in the United States 
was on an upswing 
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PART TWO: No Feudalism, No Socialism 
Consensus Scholars and the American Ethos, 1950s-1960s 
 
 The period following World War II saw a shift in the attempts to answer the Question 
“Why is there no socialism in the United State?” While it was primarily within the realm of 
radical thinkers in the first half of the century, by the second, it had been relegated to academia 
and scholarly debate. By the time World War II ended and a Cold War between the United States 
emerged radicalism had seemingly been destroyed. In the state of post-war stability and 
prosperity, academics in the social sciences and history took up the question, not in an attempt to 
learn how to usher in socialism, but instead to declare its demise. The answers primarily assumed 
an overarching character or “ethos” of the United States that predestined them toward 
moderation, and which caused the basic agreement or “consensus” that characterized the U.S. 
past. These consensus scholars sought to prove to themselves, and their critics, that the failure of 
socialism in the United States was inevitable. And so they asked: “Why, thank God, is there no 
socialism in the United States?” 
 
I. 
 
The Popular Front strategy ended temporarily with the signing of the non-aggression 
Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi-Germany in 1939. With Hitler 
and the Soviets in truce, Communist parties were ordered to switch from a position of 
cooperation with capitalist regimes to one advocating non-intervention in the growing 
“imperialist” war. With this abrupt about-face, the CPUSA lost much of the goodwill it had 
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earned the decade prior, especially as the Roosevelt administration ramped up its interventionist 
propaganda campaign. Though the Soviet Union and the United States became allies once more 
as they joined the war against the Axis Powers after Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 
1941 and the U.S. Communist movement saw a resurgence of membership during World War II 
to its all-time high of 85,000, the marriage would be short-lived.72  
Revelations of overt anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, the Soviet-backed coup in 
Czechoslovakia in 1948, the emergence of the Cold War, the growing awareness of the atrocities 
committed under Stalin’s reign, and the brutal crushing of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 
severely challenged the prospects for a global proletariat revolution. Instead of a decaying 
advanced capitalist economy on the verge of collapse, moreover, the United States emerged from 
the war as the most powerful economic and military nation in the world. Instead of the socialists’ 
hope of a return to the prewar state of depression, the United States experienced the greatest era 
of economic prosperity in its history.  
The Cold War brought heightened political repression against radicals at home that 
included a fear campaign spreading paranoia over the infiltration of and influence over U.S. 
institutions by communists. The Second Red Scare (1950-1956) as it was called, decimated the 
remaining CPUSA members and drove the rest into hiding. The Socialist party, whose 
membership had been dwindling for years, dropped out of electoral politics altogether after 
garnering less than 100,000 votes in the 1952 presidential election. Radicalism in the United 
States had declined significantly, and it appeared to many that socialism had officially failed.  
The profound ideological shift in the United States helped bring about a transformation of 
U.S. academic thought as well. By the 1930s the Progressive interpretation of history had begun 
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to falter. Turner’s frontier thesis was increasingly seen as irrelevant to the modern industrial 
society and scholars grew weary of the Beardian model solely based on economic conflict.73  
World War II was the deathblow to progressivism. The view that mankind was always 
progressing was shattered by the unprecedented level of violence and bloodshed surrounding the 
war. How could one reconcile these horrors with liberal confidence in the constant betterment of 
man? The stage was set for the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr to be the unlikely impetus for a 
monumental shift in the historical profession. Starting out as a social gospel evangelical minister 
in inner city Detroit, in the 1920s, Niebuhr soon became restless of Marxist doctrines, seeing 
humans as more complex than economically driven, and identifying the irrational elements by 
which people act against their own interests.  
In a world torn apart by totalitarian regimes on both the right and the left, Niebuhr 
recognized that civilization was not becoming more moral, that love and justice were not 
prevailing. Using theological, psychological and classical Greek motifs, the theologian portrayed 
a picture of man that was inherently flawed, one framed by a metaphorical “original sin.” In what 
would be called Christian Realism, Niebuhr attacked utopianism as naïve and asserted that the 
perfectibility of man was impossible. Despite this reduced belief in mankind, Niebuhr advocated 
for action, often military, and claimed the only way to confront evil in the world was with 
countervailing power, yet he insisted that democracy needed to separate from a state of 
innocence. To to preserve its values, one needed to use institutions, power, and occasionally 
coercion.  
The works of Niebuhr would have remained obscure if Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. had not 
adopted them. Distressed by rise of fascist regimes on the right and the pacifist line taken by the 
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Communists before 1941, Schlesinger came to see threats from both the left and the right. In an 
article for Life Magazine and later book titled The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom (1945), 
he claimed individual freedom was more important than equality and that the moderates of the 
world had more in common with each other than they had with the extremes and thus need to 
form a coalition to fight for liberty.74 The "‘vital center’ refers to the contest between democracy 
and totalitarianism, not to contests within democracy between liberalism and conservatism.” He 
stated.75 This concept that conservatism and liberalism are actually mostly in agreement and 
represent a moderate middle ground between the extreme left and right would became very 
influential to a new generation of historians who had turned to Niebuhr and Schlesinger’s 
concepts to replace the seemingly outdated progressive interpretation.  
The U.S. historian Richard Hofstadter in his iconoclastic book, The American Political 
Tradition (1948), first elucidated this theory of the moderation of the United States. Influenced 
by the common experiences of a unified nation at war, followed soon after by the onset of the 
Cold War against a common enemy and a period of prolonged prosperity, Hofstadter maintained 
that conflict was not as important a force in U.S. society as the Progressives had once stressed. 
Instead, a new generation of historians emerged to emphasize the shared values of people in the 
United States and what brought them together as opposed to what divided them. The history that 
stressed continuity or consensus throughout the U.S. past became known as the “Counter-
Progressive” or “Consensus” model and by the mid-1950s was firmly established as the 
dominant school in U.S. scholarship.76 
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II. 
 
 The consensus model was predicated upon the belief that the history of the United States 
was marked by cooperation and moderation as opposed to conflict and extremism. At the center 
of this was the assumption that something inherent in the ethos or character of the United States 
was antithetical to radicalism. Since the lack of U.S. socialism was central to the entire 
intellectual school, theories as to why socialism failed in the United States became central to 
many of its interpretations of U.S. History. 
The most influential of the consensus interpretations addressing the lack of socialism in 
the United States came from the U.S. political scientist Louis Hartz. In his seminal work The 
Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the 
Revolution (1955), Hartz argues that the United States is founded on the concepts of the 17th 
century English philosopher John Locke that espouse equality, liberty, representative democracy, 
restraints on the government, civil rights, laissez faire-capitalism, and private property rights. 
This form of Lockean liberalism, insists Hartz, became so deeply engrained within the United 
States that radicalism could not find fertile ground: 
For swallowing up both peasantry and proletariat into the “petit-bourgeois” scheme, 
America created two unusual effects. It prevented socialism from challenging its Liberal 
Reform in any effective way, and at the same time it enslaved its Liberal Reform to the 
Alger dream of democratic capitalism.77 
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The reason Hartz gave for this particularly strong tendency towards U.S. liberalism can 
be summed up by his famous adage: “No feudalism, No socialism,” the fact that unlike Europe, 
the United States lacked a feudal past: 
It is not accidental that America which has uniquely lacked a feudal tradition has 
uniquely lacked also a socialist tradition. The hidden origin of socialist thought 
everywhere in the West is to be found in feudalism ethos… Everywhere in Europe, in 
MacDonald’s England hardly less than in Kautsky’s Germany, socialism was inspired 
considerably by the class spirit that hung over not from capitalism but from the feudal 
system itself.78 
For Hartz, The United States was a thoroughly bourgeois nation. It never experienced 
feudalism, the pre-capitalist system based on the servitude of the peasants to the propertied 
aristocratic class, and was founded entirely on liberal Enlightenment ideals. This was the cause 
for the consensus in the United States. Instead of a history of conflict between classes over the 
proper way to structure society, Hartz contended that throughout U.S. history both the right and 
the left in the United States had agreed upon the basic social structure. The United States not 
only lacked a socialist or radical left party, but also a Tory or extreme right segment of society. It 
was, by nature, moderate.  Because the United States was free from this feudal baggage, class-
lines were less permanent and this was the reason, according to Hartz, why there was less class 
consciousness among U.S. workers, and therefore, less class conflict. 
Along the same vein of Perlman’s “free gift of the ballot,” Hartz stressed how the United 
States skipped the struggle for emancipation under feudalism since “socialism arises not to fight 
capitalism but the remnants of feudalism itself…”79 The lack of feudalism in the United States 
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also meant an absence of what Hartz called a “medieval corporate spirit.”80 Europeans peasant 
under feudalism acted and thought in a much more collective manner. With this lacking in the 
United States, the socialist had the impossible task of trying to recreate a form of collectivism 
that had no place in the traditions of U.S. workers. Socialists failed in part because their lack of 
understanding the peculiarities of the U.S. public led to their “persistent use of European 
concepts of Marxism” where it was not applicable.81 So not only a pervasive liberalism, and an 
obstructed class consciousness, but also a lack of collectivism can all be attributed to a lack of 
feudalism, according to Hartz. 
It should be noted that this focus on feudalism did not originate solely with Hartz. Going 
back decades, thinkers including Marx, Engels, Sombart, Trotsky, Lenin, and Gramsci have all 
made the connection between the United States’ unique position and its lack of a feudal past.82 
Writing in 1906, H.G. Wells declared: 
[My] chief argument is that the Americans started almost clear of medieval heritage, and 
developed in... the modern type of productive social organization. They took the 
economic conventions that were modern and progressive at the end of the eighteenth 
century and stamped them into the Constitution as if they meant to stamp them there for 
all time… America is pure eighteenth century 83 
Under Hartz, however, this theory took on new dimensions. It perfectly encapsulated the 
spirit of consensus scholarship in the post-war United States. Consensus historians shared a 
common theoretical framework that citizen of the United States across the centuries had agreed 
upon how to structure society, and that this agreement on democracy and liberal capitalism 
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prevented conflict, diminished differences and explained the absence of extreme ideologies like 
socialism.84 
 
III. 
 
While ranking as one of the most important explanations of American exceptionalism, 
Hartz’s Liberal Tradition was not a celebration of American capitalism. Actually it lamented The 
United States’ incapacity to deal with the complex realities of the modern world because of its 
confinement within the liberal ethos.85 Viewed in this light, the Liberal Tradition could almost 
be considered Marxist, in how it assumes the inevitability of socialism if the prescribed 
precursors are in place.  
Other consensus interpretations of U.S socialism were not as generous. It was this 
generation that, instead of wondering when, or if, socialism would come to the United States, 
declared emphatically that it would not. And in the geo-political landscape of the Cold War, 
much of the scholarship surrounding radicalism was as much an obituary for socialism as it was 
a victory cry for U.S. capitalism and national traditions of moderation. 
For example, the jingoistic U.S. historian Daniel Boorstin in The Genius of American 
Politics (1953) proclaimed it was the praiseworthy pragmatism of the U.S. public, which allowed 
them to escape the destructive ideologies of Europe.86 Clinton Rossiter, the historian and 
political scientist, refers to an all-encompassing “American tradition” in Marxism: the View from 
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America (1960).87 According to Rossiter, the American tradition is “consciously pluralistic. Its 
unity is the result and process through which unnumbered diversities of faith and intellect seek to 
live together in accommodation…[It] is doggedly individualistic… It understands that freedom is 
an eternal paradox…”88 It is, 
a casual blend of conservatism and liberalism. It is conservative… because it is cautious and 
moderate, because it is disposed to preserve what it has inherited, because it puts a high value on 
tradition as a social force and prudence as an individual virtue… Yet it is liberal, too… because it 
is open-handed and open-minded, because it really expects the future to be better than the past, 
because it is interested first of all in the development of free men.89 
 It is this tradition, he believes, that prevents Marxism from taking hold. People of the 
United States are too rational for socialism. And while Marxists are well intentioned, they fall 
prey to economic determinism and come to see life only as the product of economics. Only the 
U.S. system based on collaboration and individualism can see men for the “robust individuals” 
they are and “not just a good member of an economic class.”90 For Rossiter the overarching 
ethos of the United States made socialism impossible.  
 Other scholars of this time looked to more tangible aspects of the U.S. experience for 
possible answers, though with the same all-encompassing approach of their colleagues. 
Reflecting the postwar economic boom, academics such as economists Charles A. Gulick and 
Melvin Bers writing in the journal Industrial Labor Relations Review, reiterated Sombart’s 
emphasis on the affluence of the United States as an inhibiting factor: 
There is in the American experience one colossal datum which has stood above all the 
rest. It has been the fact of a tremendously growing level of material well being yielded 
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by the system as a whole… the American wage earner has experienced over a seventy-
five year period a rate of economic betterment which has made him labor aristocrat of the 
world. 91 
According to Gulick and Bers pervasive prosperity not only provided support of the 
capitalist system, or at least an apathy to a program of change, but led to the consensus 
model of labor relations, where workers acted in what Selig Perlman referred to as a “job-
conscious” manner, agreeing to forgo political action in exchange for a seat at the table 
with government and business management as economic partners. 92 
 Historian of the U.S. South David M. Potter added to the discussion by claiming in 
People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character (1954), that the United 
States had been defined by its sheer immensity of wealth and resources. It is this abundance, he 
suggested, that has prevented radical movement:  
Essentially, the difference is that Europe has always conceived of redistribution of wealth 
as necessitating the expropriation of some and the corresponding aggrandizement of 
others; but America has conceived of it primarily in the terms of giving to some without 
taking from others. 93 
Influenced by the U.S. postwar prosperity, the theory held that in the United States, 
unlike Europe, there was enough wealth to go around. This affluence not only prevented class 
conflict, according to Potter, but contributed to cooperation in society, as every class in the 
United States came to realize that they all could achieve more by working together.  
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IV. 
 
 While explanations concerning the United States’ lack of socialism continued to focus on 
affluence and tangible effects, most scholars did so under a framework of an overarching U.S. 
ethos. Some intrepid scholars sought to combine the two. In Social Mobility in Industrial Society 
(1959), political scientist Seymour M. Lipset and sociologist Reinhard Bendix discussed both 
influences, not only, the level of affluence and social mobility that kept radicalism at bay, they 
argued, but a pervasive spirit in the United States that this affluence was attainable. “For as a 
matter of fact it is not really clear whether the different political orientation of the American and 
European worker reflects different opportunities for social mobility or only a difference in their 
ethos!” they stated.94 Lipset and Bendix tried to show that a main part of the ethos of the United 
States was the belief in the “American Dream” of social mobility, which encouraged workers to 
work within the system to achieve their desire, instead of working to change it.  
The common framework of trying to apply an overarching ethos was also used to 
examine the peculiarities of the U.S. working class as a possible explanation for the lack of 
socialism in the United States. Adolph Sturmthal, the Austrian-American political scientist and 
sociologist of labor studies and international relations, started with Hartz’s now commonplace 
explanation of the “absence of feudalism” and concluded that U.S. workers were more 
independent of the state. In another contribution to the Industrial and Labor Relations Review 
(1951), Sturmthal contrasted this with the conditions in Europe, where a tradition of enlightened 
absolutism under the monarchies of feudalism, left in place a hierarchical and stratified society.  
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According to Sturmthal, the lower classes under enlightened absolutism became 
accustomed to a certain amount of dependence on the state. This “belief in the all-powerful 
state,” in turn, led to the “peculiar tendency of European labor to settle by law the problem of 
labor relations that American unions traditionally solve by way of collective agreement.”95 U.S. 
workers lacked this statist attitude, and engaged in Selig Perlman’s “business unionism” where 
they sought out only economic demands and dealt directly with their employers through 
contracts and negotiations. European unions, in contrast, worked within the framework of the 
state and went through political channels, which led to political organization based on class 
factors, and eventually a sizeable socialist movement.96 
 U.S. labor historian Marc Karson’s American Labor Unions and Politics 1900-1918 
(1958) described pervasive middle class individualism and an anti-statist fear of a strong central 
government as the “central creed” of U.S. workers: 
The American worker feels middle-class and behaves middle-class. To understand his 
politics, one must recognize his psychology, a large part of which is middle-class 
derived… When Socialists criticize the self-interest and acquisitive spirit of capitalism, 
the worker feels under attack for within himself, he knows, burns the capitalistic spirit.97 
Karson attributed the conservatism of U.S. labor unions to Samuel Gompers, the 
influential president of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) from 1886 until his death in 
1924. Under Gompers’ tutelage the AFL became the United States’ largest and most powerful 
labor organization. Though Gompers initially had been sympathetic to socialist politics, noted 
Karson, he turned away from class issues towards harmonious cooperation with capitalism and 
business unionism.  
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The Labor movement under Gompers focused on “pure-and-simple” unionism devoted 
mainly to “bread-and-butter” economic issues such as issues of wages, benefits, hours, seniority, 
anti-injunction legislation, and working conditions, all of which could be negotiated through 
collective bargaining.98 In politics, the Federation sought "political nonpartisanship," or as 
Gompers put it, a promise to "elect their friends and defeat their enemies." This meant they 
avoided grand reform proposals or direct political action such as the formation of a labor party in 
favor of maintaining an independent political agenda and leveraging labor’s mobilization in 
exchange for support.99  
 
V. 
 
As Karson explained, Gompers rejected the industrial unionism of the more radical 
Knights of Labor, and later the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), which advocated 
organizing all workers within an industry regardless of skill or position. Instead, the AFL 
remained substantially the domain of skilled, white, native-born, male workers, or the labor 
aristocracy. This nativist, labor-segmentation approach prevented repression and by World War 
I, Gompers was able to leverage his position for political favors as he was appointed to the to the 
Council of National Defense by President Woodrow Wilson. There he helped craft national labor 
policy, including explicit government support for independent trade unions and collective 
bargaining in exchange for the wartime mobilization of the labor movement. Gompers and the 
AFL, as a result, gained clout in national politics and undue influence over the entire labor 
movement in the United States up to the 1930s.  
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According to Karson, it was, in large part Gompers’s ideological leadership that changed 
the face of the AFL, as well as the organized U.S. working class.100 Beyond the influence of 
Gompers, however, Karson also attributed the conservative psychology of the workers to the 
Roman Catholic faith of the large number of immigrants within its ranks. In a 1951 journal 
article for Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Karson argued that the “weakness of 
socialism” in the AFL “was, in part, a testimonial to the success of the Catholic Church’s 
opposition to the doctrine.” 101  
The prolific U.S. social historian Oscar Handlin also attributed socialism’s failure, at 
least in part, to Catholicism. In his groundbreaking study, Boston’s Immigrants, 1790-1865: A 
Study in Acculturation (1941), Handlin singled out the Irish as especially anti-radical, with 
efforts to change the world being viewed from futile to sacrilegious. For Handlin, however, the 
argument went backwards.102 It was not religion that made the Irish conservative, but their 
former conservative nature that made them religious. And the most important feature 
contributing to the overarching conservative ethos of the Irish was their peasant status. In “The 
Immigrant and American Politics,” in Foreign Influence in American Life (1944), Handlin 
argued that the trauma of transplanting communities to a foreign land isolated and alienated 
peasant immigrants: 
Perhaps the most prevalent myth about immigrants links them with radicalism, but 
nothing could be farther from the truth. The overwhelming majority were exceedingly 
conservative in politics, as in other forms of social expression. The peasant origins of 
many, and the comparative backwardness of the societies from which they emigrated, 
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bred a submissiveness which was not shed in the crossing. In fact the very process of 
emigration fosters it. 103 
It was this shock of emigration that caused the immigrant of peasant backgrounds to turn inward 
to the security of ethnic ties or religion, and reject the call of radicalism.104  
Consensus thought is readily apparent in the seminal work, The End of Ideology: On the 
Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (1960), by the U.S. sociologist Daniel Bell. Going 
beyond a consensus examination of the working class, Bell took the concept of an all-
encompassing U.S. ethos and applied it to the radical parties themselves. He argued that the 
grand ideologies of the nineteenth century were becoming outdated as the United States moved 
beyond the need for any ideologies. In this view, ideologically driven individuals or groups such 
as socialists were inherently irrational and unreasonable and thus doomed to failure.  
Bell suggested that the interplay of competing interests in politics required compromise. 
Socialists were incapable of such pragmatism, he declared: 
It is my argument that failure of socialist movement in the United States was rooted in its 
inability to resolve a basic dilemma of ethics and politics: the socialist movement by the 
way in which it stated its goal, and by way in which it rejected the capitalist order as a 
whole, could not relate itself to the specific problems of social action in the here and now, 
give and take political world. In Sum: it was trapped by the unhappy problem of living in 
but not of the world; it could only act, and then inadequately, as the moral, but not 
political, man in immoral society.105 
 Bell asserted that socialists had two choices. They could remain outside of society or they 
could join it. From within they could try to influence the system but this would entail sacrificing 
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some of their beliefs and lending de facto support to the system while possibly contributing to its 
survival by alleviating some of its systemic problems. If they remained on the outside, however, 
they could maintain their ideological purity and credibility, but they would all give up any ability 
to influence politics and simply act as a philosophical or ethical voice until the system collapsed 
on itself. U.S. Socialists, Bell contended, when faced with the problem of “living in but not of 
the world,” chose to straddle the line between the two. Yet their ideological rigidity prevented 
them from making the necessary sacrifices to succeed.106  
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PART THREE: History from the Bottom Up 
The New Left’s Search for a Usable Past of U.S. Socialism, 1960s-1970s 
 
The Consensus scholarship was shattered with the social upheaval of the 1960s and 
1970s and was challenged by New Left historiography, which was no less influenced by the 
interests and needs of its generation. Inspired by the social justice movements of the era, a 
number of historians and social scientists increased focus on the lives of the dispossessed. This 
desire for a “history from the bottom up” shaped the way scholars answered the Question. 
Attention to the lives of rank-and-file workers and to the roots of the racial conflicts of the 1960s 
and 1970s led to explanations centering on the racial and ethnic divides within the U.S. 
workforce and the emergence of radical parties as a reason for “no socialism” in the United 
States. 
An equally important development of this era was the search for a “usable past.” Scholars 
involved with the social justice movements of the day often sought a history that would 
encourage these struggles. This led some New Left academics to assign blame to the internal 
problems of the socialist movement. Such an approach not only refuted the “ethos” explanations 
of the Consensus era, but suggested that if these problems were fixable, then major social 
transformation in the United States was still possible. Other usable explanations focused on 
governmental repression, and the absorption of radicalism into mainstream movements, both 
contemporary concerns of the New Left. In effect, New Left scholars were simultaneously 
asking “Why, Goddammit was there no socialism?” as well as “How can there be Socialism in 
the United States?” 
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I. 
 
As an example of Consensus scholarship, Bell’s work reacted to the rise of extremist 
ideologies in Europe during the 1930 by placing a high price on moderation. Scholars such as 
Hartz, Boorstin, or Rossiter viewed U.S. capitalism as, if not desirable, then at least inevitable. 
And after experiencing the public unity that emerged during World War II and found a new 
common enemy in the Cold War, these academics often portrayed U.S. history as one of 
harmony and agreement in regard to matters of political economy. 
Despite the dominance of the Consensus paradigm, however, several social conflicts 
threatened to unravel not only the academy, but society as a whole. By the 1960s the nascent 
African-American civil rights movement soon garnered national attention by confronting the 
system of racial segregation in the U.S. South. U.S foreign policy saw the escalation of the war 
in Vietnam, which, to its critics, represented not the fair and just United States of the Consensus 
School, but rather an imperial venture designed to preserve capitalism. And as the casualties 
grew, so too did an anti-war movement swollen by the hoards of young people born in the boom 
following World War II now coming of age. Out of this new generation emerged a renewed zeal 
for social justice issues and a counterculture that revolutionized social and cultural norms about 
clothing, music, drugs, dress, formalities, and schooling. 
The Consensus School could not explain the anomalies of poverty, racism, militarism, 
social disruption and violence that dominated public discourse by the Sixties. A framework 
emphasizing cooperation and unity increasingly seemed out of touch in the face of such blatant 
contradictions, and several scholars began to turn on its established wisdom. John Higham, the 
U.S. historian of home-grown nativism, was the first to name and criticize Consensus School in 
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the article for Commentary, “The Cult of the ‘American Consensus’: Homogenizing Our History 
(1959),” for seeking to “show us a single homogenized culture,” by carrying out “a massive 
grading operation to smooth over America’s social convulsions.”107 In his influential article in 
America Historical Review, “Beyond Consensus: The Historian as a Moral Critic’ (1959), 
Higham called for a return to moral engagement.108  
One of the earliest and most influential scholars to shift away from the Consensus 
framework was William Appleman Williams. Williams’ rereading of U.S. diplomatic history 
helped set the tone for a general reinterpretation for the next generation of scholars. In The 
Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1959), Williams challenged conventional interpretations on 
The United States’ rise to world power status by claiming that U.S foreign policy was motivated 
by underlying expansionist tendencies rooted in an imperialist or “Open Door” policy. Williams 
turned the standard consensus interpretation of the Cold War around, blaming the United States, 
in part, for provoking a conflict with the Soviet Union.109  
As a sharp departure from the consensus model these radical interpretations shook 
conventional wisdom. Williams used the analytical tools of Niebuhr and turned them against the 
elites. Taking the consensus idea of pluralist powers balancing each other out, Williams put a 
spin on it and suggested it was actually a strategy of corporate interests seeking to stabilize 
capitalism through a collaboration between business, government, and labor. In this view, elites 
would make concessions that would ensure a long-term benefit of lowered class conflict through 
cooperation from the government. By inspiring a paradigm shift throughout the U.S. academy, 
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Williams became known as the “grand old man” of what would be called New Left” 
scholarship.110  
Under the New Left paradigm, the perennial question of why there is no socialism in the 
United States took on new significance. Accordingly, New Left scholars immediately went to 
work to dismantle the Hartzian/consensus interpretation. The British sociologist Tom Bottomore, 
for example, asserted in his essay, “Comment on The Relevance of Marxism,” that the problem 
with the consensus explanation lied in its “notion of a single American ‘tradition,’ particularly in 
its conceptions of American democracy as the final attainment of the ‘good society,’ and the 
fundamental unchangeability of American institutions.”111  
Beyond this, New Left scholars attacked the Hartzian/consensus explanation for its lack 
of conflict. As U.S. social historian Eric Foner wrote, 
The notion of an overarching liberal consensus went far toward understanding the context 
within which Hartz wrote – America of the 1950’s – but has proved of little value in 
explaining the strength of challenges to the capitalist order ranging from the class 
violence of 1877 to the Knights of Labor, Populism, and the old Socialist Party.112 
As turmoil racked society, conflict came to the forefront of social sciences once again, 
and the consensus explanation that was based on the denying of any major upheavals throughout 
U.S. history had to be disregarded.    
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II. 
 
Another critique of Consensus targeted an overarching U.S. ethos incompatible with the 
view that the United States was made of a multitude of diverse elements. Mirroring changing 
social beliefs about equity, a dominant feature of New Left scholarship was the belief that 
ordinary people possessed both the ability and the right to make decision for themselves.113 
Suddenly the oppressed, the poor, and the exploited became central to many new studies as a 
“new social” history replaced the focus on the activities or ideas of elites. An interest in the 
diverse identities and historical experience of subordinate groups and a critical view of power 
structures led to a tendency toward what U.S. radical historian Jessie Lemisch, called “history 
from the bottom up.”114 
A new generation of scholars now promoted the study of ordinary people throughout the 
past who often left no written record requiring new techniques. Some social historians began to 
use census data and evidence to try to extrapolate details from the populations of the past. The 
first major work to utilize these methods had been The Making of an American Community: A 
Case Study of Democracy in a Frontier County (1956), by the U.S. Progressive historian Merle 
Curti.115 His use of statistics and social science methodologies to systematically examine the 
social mobility of entire population of a frontier county set it apart from the older social history 
and helped establish the methodology for the new “Quantitative History” that would become 
central to many new social schools of historical analysis.116 
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Quantitative history was soon used as a new tool in the arsenal of academics to address 
the topic of radicalism in the United States. U.S. historian Stephan Thernstrum adopted 
quantitative methods to test the assumption of many Consensus academics regarding the high 
levels of mobility of the United States. Going back to Marx and Sombart, commentators had 
asserted that high comparative levels of social mobility were major contributors to the lack of 
U.S. socialism. However, this theory rested entirely on conjecture and assumptions regarding the 
level of affluence of U.S. society, until Thernstrum put it to the test.  
Examining the working-class city of Newburyport, Massachusetts for the years 1850 to 
1880 and Boston from 1880 to 1963, Thernstrum, in his book Poverty and Progress: Social 
Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City (1964), concluded that the United States did have high 
levels of mobility when compared to the city of Marseilles in France. He also found that U.S. 
workers were likely to leave their place of birth, earn more money progressively over the course 
of their lives, earn more than their fathers, and enter into the property owning class. Yet 
homeownership required a severe limit on family spending and employment of the entire family. 
Those who did manage to attain the marker of “middle-class” success, did so often at the cost of 
their family’s comfort, putting women and children to work and requiring a level of austerity 
bordering on “ruthless under consumption.”117 Other scholars using the new methods of 
quantitative history, such as Tom Rishøj, published in the interdisciplinary journal on 
methodology Quality and Quantity, found that European cities such as Copenhagen had 
comparable rates of mobility to many U.S. Cities, if not higher rates.118  
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Another new field that emerged in the 1970s was “ethnic studies”. Inspired by the racial 
tensions of 1960s, ethnic studies used the concept of history from the bottom up to bring 
attention to the diverse makeup of U.S. society. Scholars such as Iring Fetscher, the German 
political scientist, used this new field to help explain the United States’ unique ethnic mix. 
Fetscher argued that previous scholarship had failed to appreciate the rich diversity of U.S. 
society. Their model, he argued, 
treats the American working class as a single unity. But in fact this has never been the 
case, and in the U.S.A. less so than in any other capitalist country. Not only does [it] not 
mention the Negro, but [it] overlooks the importance of the constant inflow of 
immigrants and the marked distinction between immigrants from the different part of 
Europe and Asia.119 
Immigration and diversity, according to Fetscher, disproved the idea of a homogenous 
U.S. ethos, and therefore the Hartzian/consensus interpretation. Yet it also has been the same 
factor that that impeded the growth of socialism in the United States, he suggested, because it 
discouraged “the creation of a genuine sense of class consciousness and class solidarity” among 
a proletariat too heterogeneous to unite around class issues.120  
Investigating racial and ethnic conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s, Mike Davis, the writer, 
activist and historian, constructed a theory in his article “Why the U.S. Working Class is 
Different (1980),” in the New Left Review, in which diversity affected class consciousness in a 
different way. According to Davis, immigrant groups often formed complex ethnic and social 
networks that intended to forge cross class alliances based on shared ethnicity. These networks 
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diminished the strength of unions and class-based political parties, which sought to diminish 
ethnic loyalties and accentuate class.121  
Sociologist Gerald Rosenblum, in Immigrant Workers: Their Impact of American Labor 
Radicalism (1973), used ethnic studies to help explain U.S. radicalism by focusing on the “new 
immigrants” that came to the United States during the intense period of immigration and 
industrialization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century from Southern, Central and 
Eastern Europe. But rather than immigrants, Rosenblum argued, these workers should be viewed 
as more akin to migrant laborers, or “sojourners,” “insofar as their goals were short-term, 
narrowly economic, and oriented toward ultimate return to their home society.” Rosenblum 
pointed out that in 1910 three-quarters as many Italians migrants left the United States as arrived, 
making the Irish and the Jews the mainstay of organized labor in this period because these 
newcomers could not return home. The focus of the rest of the immigrants on economic gains, he 
explained, helped buttress the “business unionism” of the U.S. labor movement and diminished 
its radical potential.122  
The ethnic focus inspired by the New Left also looked into the divisions between the new 
immigrant communities and “old immigrants” who consisted primarily of the Irish and Northern 
and Western Europeans. Iring Fetscher pointed out how in an attempt to differentiate themselves 
from the new undesirables, the old immigrants often excluded the “newcomers” from spheres 
where they were already established: 
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The newcomers were not allowed to play a leading part in politics and as soon as they had 
become ‘citizens,’ they tended to distinguish themselves as much as they could from the next 
generation of newcomers ‘below them,’ as well as from the Establishment above.123 
In addition to the inter-generational divisions of immigrants, Sociologist Charles 
Leinenweber’s “The American Socialist Party and ‘New’ Immigrants (1968),” in Science and 
Society, made the point that an even greater rift stemming from immigration accounts for the 
failure of socialism in the United States. Nativism, or the opposition to immigration from the 
U.S. working class and the Socialist Party, he suggested, was to blame for socialism’s failure 
“motivated by nativism and racism,” Leinenweber asserted that the Socialist Party “kept these 
immigrant socialists adrift, failing to integrate them,” as the party’s “municipal” wing, sought 
electoral victories in cities and broad acceptance as a progressive reform party. 124 
To gain acceptance, the Socialist Party aligned itself with the conservative AFL, whose 
opposition to immigration stemmed from the desire to curb cheap labor, a threat to the economic 
prospects of skilled workers. This anti-immigration stance was approved over the protests of the 
“industrial,” or more radical left wing of the party primarily concerned with ideological purity 
and revolutionary potential. Leinenweber avowed that “so long as the party was controlled by the 
right wing, it was incapable of molding a socialist army out of the new immigrants.” Because the 
U.S. socialist movement failed to properly court the immigrant population, it could never 
establish a sizeable party he concluded. 125  
Economists Michael Reich, David M. Gordon and Richard C. Edwards also viewed the 
ethnic segmentation of workforce in the United States as an impediment to class consciousness 
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and action. Their report published in the American Economic Review, showed how the division 
between native-born skilled workers and unskilled immigrant laborers discouraged radical unity: 
Labor market segmentation arose and is perpetuated because… it helps reproduce 
capitalist hegemony. Firs… segmentation divides workers and forestalls potential 
movements uniting all workers against employers. Second, segmentation establishes "fire 
trails" across vertical job ladders and, to the extent that workers perceive separate 
segments with different criteria for access, workers limit their own aspirations for 
mobility. Less pressure is then placed on other social institutions- the schools and the 
family, for example- that reproduce the class structure. Third, division of workers into 
segments legitimizes inequalities in authority and control between superiors and 
subordinates. 126 
According to the report, this segmentation is the deliberate outcome of the concerted effort of the 
capitalist class to forestall radicalism among workers in the United States. 
 
 
III. 
 
Despite such conclusions, not all ethnic studies scholars agreed that immigration and 
diversity curbed radicalism. Victor Greene argued in The Slavic Community on Strike: 
Immigrant Labor in Pennsylvania Anthracite (1968) that the presence of immigrant workers in 
United Mine Workers (UNW) strikes in the Pennsylvania anthracite coal region in the 1880s 
increased the militancy of the strikers. Immigrants were “…more tenacious in their hold upon 
their right to organize even more than the Americans,” concluded Greene. The practice of 
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organizing worker councils around ethnic lines, he suggested, tapped into ethnic community 
structures already in place and helped to strengthened union cohesion.127  
 More positive assessments of the ties between ethnicity and radicalism stemmed from 
practitioners of “New Labor” studies, a genre inspired by the seminal work of British social 
historian E.P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Class (1964)128. Thompson, an avowedly 
partisan Marxist, focused on the experiences of actual workers instead of the traditional method 
of studying the hierarchies of trade unions, the development of markets, or political philosophies. 
It is no surprise, then, that many New Labor scholars assumed a critical stance when it came to 
traditional labor elites. Jeremy Brecher, a U.S. historian of social movements, went as far as to 
blame their mismanagement for the failure of socialism in the United States. In his book Strike! 
(1972), Brecher examined the country’s largest walkouts ranging from the Great Railroad Strike 
of 1877, in which federal troops had to be called in against waves of spontaneous violence, to the 
Strike Wave of 1946, the postwar labor actions that were the largest in U.S. History. Brecher 
concluded that rank-and-file workers were much more militant than often given credit, and that it 
was the organization and the leadership that dampened their revolutionary zeal.129  
Here Brecher turned both Lenin and Perlman on their heads. Instead of a conservative 
working class radicalized by intellectuals and leaders, it was the leaders that lagged behind the 
rank and file. And though Brecher’s argument might seem similar to Marc Karson’s in that they 
both emphasized the leadership of the labor movement, Karson’s focus on Gompers arose from 
the consensus school’s fixation on powerful individuals while Brecher’s approach derived from a 
contemporary distrust of institutions and hierarchies. 
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 Several New Left scholars sought to create a history that provided models of success and 
inspiration by constructing a “usable past.” Charles Leinenweber, reflecting on his own work in 
1984, 
The American Socialist Party and “New” Immigrants written early in 1967 in Berkley, 
California, during the building of the antiwar and black power movements. On the one 
hand, it was intended as a contribution to the ongoing debate “why no socialism in 
America?” On the other, it was intended to address implicitly the practical matter of 
creating a new socialist movement.130 
Activist historian Staughton Lynd also pointed out the importance of creating a usable past in 
addressing the question of “why is there no socialism in the United States?” “We must ask it not 
as detached spectators,” Lynd demanded, 
but as men and women who will attempt to act out an answer. We must ask, not: Why is 
there still no socialist movement in the United States?, but: Can a socialist movement in 
the United States be built?...We will not know whether socialism in America is possible 
until, once more, we try.131 
An increasingly appealing topic for New Left scholars, in this context, became the 
actions of the radical parties themselves. If the previous failures of radical movements were due 
to the mistakes of individuals, tactics, beliefs, or policies, then the modern movements could 
learn how to avoid those mistakes. On the other hand, if there was something inherent in U.S. 
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culture and society that prevented radicalism, then modern day movements stood very little 
chance of success, no matter what they did.132  
 The most popular manifestation of the “internal” approach to the failure of socialism in 
the United States was directed at the leadership of the radical parties. Radical historian Paul 
Buhle maintained in an essay on Debsian Socialism and the ‘New Immigrant’ worker, in 1973 
that it was not the working class, nor the labor elite, but the socialist leadership that was too 
conservative. During the first two decades of the twentieth century, he pointed out, the Socialist 
Party had made great inroads in the nation’s political scene, especially in local elections. In 1912 
Socialists were elected to over 1200 local offices, thirty-three state legislative positions, and a 
number of leadership posts in municipal governments. However, according to Buhle, the Party’s 
obsession with electoral victories meant it failed to respond to the massive labor upheavals of the 
day. Inspired in part by nativism, it focused instead on native-born small farmers, skilled 
workers, and professionals and intellectuals instead of the factory workers and unskilled laborers 
essential to a successful movement.133   
Historian of U.S. labor and social movements, John Laslett, while denouncing Daniel 
Bell in a commentary in 1974, also argued that U.S. Socialists lacked a proper level of radicalism 
to succeed. This was especially so in the 1930s, Laslett suggested, when the “rightward drift” of 
the Socialist Party “made it so reformist as to abandon all serious attempts at socialism,” making 
it “virtually indistinguishable from the Democrats.”134 These explanations not only served to free 
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U.S. history from a consensual ethos, but also served as a rallying cry for more radicalism in the 
contemporary movement.  
 James Weinstein, the socialist historian and journalist, came to a different conclusion. As 
Weinstein argued in The Decline of Socialism in America, 1912-1925 (1967), the Socialist Party 
from 1900 to 1919 had not mistakenly aimed its focus on electoral victories but in fact succeeded 
at becoming a successful reform party. Unlike many scholars, Weinstein maintained that the 
Party’s decline did not happen before or even during World War II, but after the impact of the 
Russian Revolution. Similar to Daniel Bell, Weinstein contended that the faction of the party 
allied to the Comintern succumbed to ideological rigidity and tried to impose a strict Soviet–style 
ideology upon the rest of the Old Left. What had been a broad popular movement, according to 
Weinstein, fell victim to factionalism and infighting, a lesson the author hoped to apply to the 
contemporary movement.135  
 Sociologist and labor-historian, Melvyn Dubofsky’s book We Shall Be All: A History of 
the Industrial Workers of the World (1969), looked at the IWW to examine the level of 
radicalism in the U.S. labor movement. The IWW was a mass-based union founded in 1905 as a 
radical alternative to the conservative AFL. IWW members, or Wobblies as they were known, 
advocated revolutionary socialism, workplace democracy and industrial unionism, where all 
workers in the same industry are organized into the same union, unlike the craft unionism of the 
AFL which only included skilled, white laborers. The IWW extended membership to all 
wageworkers regardless of race, creed, color or sex, and engaged in direct action resistance, even 
occasional sabotage, quickly earning it a widespread reputation, either romanticized or 
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demonized. For these reasons the IWW served as the perfect topic of a usable past, as Dubofsky 
explained: 
Although the IWW ultimately failed to achieve its major objectives, it nevertheless 
bequeathed Americans an invaluable legacy. Those young Americans who practice direct 
action, passive resistance, and civil disobedience, and who seek an authentic “radical 
tradition,” should find much to ponder in the Wobblies past. Those who distrust 
establishment politics, deride bureaucracies, favor community action, and preach 
“participatory democracy” would also do well to remember the history of the IWW. 
Indeed, all who prefer a society based upon community to one founded on coercion 
cannot afford to neglect the tragic history of the IWW.136 
As an all-inclusive, decentralized, and radical movement, the IWW appeared as a much 
better role model for current struggles than the conservative and bureaucratic Socialist Party or 
mainstream labor unions. However, according to Dubofsky, it was this radicalism that spelled 
defeat for the Wobblies. Pointing to the inherent difficulties in revolutionary movements, and the 
impossible balance between reform and rebellion, Dubofsky noted that the IWW needed to show 
its workers tangible results to justify their allegiance. Yet if the IWW allowed workers to fight 
for immediate improvements, the possibility was that they could win, “a result which, if 
achieved, inevitably diminished their discontent and hence their revolutionary potential.”137 
Recognition of this dilemma led to the union’s refusal to sign contracts with employers, 
believing that such agreements limited workers' ability to strike, and that it would then place the 
union in the position of enforcing capitalist demands upon its workers. As Dubofsky 
acknowledged, 
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Employers constantly used the IWW’s no-contract principle to rationalize their own 
resistance to any form of collective bargaining. If the IWW could not negotiate with 
employers, how could it raise wages or improve working conditions? On the other hand, 
if the IWW did sanction contracts, win recognition, and improve its members’ lives, what 
would keep them from forsaking revolutionary goals and adhering to the well-established 
AFL pattern? If the IWW began to declare truces in the class war, how could it bring 
about the ultimate revolution? In the end, IWW leaders usually subordinated reform 
opportunities to revolutionary necessities, while the rank and file, when it could, took 
reform and neglected the revolution.138 
Strangely reminiscent of Daniel Bell’s theory, Dubofsky pictured the Wobblies as straddling the 
line between being of the world and in the world, a balance they ultimately failed to sustain. 
 
IV 
 
Another New Left explanation for the failure of radicalism in the United States was 
outright repression. “Violence and bloodshed did follow Wobblies wherever they fought for free 
speech or higher wages,” claimed Dubofsky.139 Historian and civil libertarian William Preston 
Jr.’s Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals 1903-1933 (1963), also highlights 
repression as a central factor curbing U.S. radicalism, specifically in reference to the IWW and 
the events surrounding the First World War. As the United States entered the European war in 
1917, moderate unions were rewarded for cooperation. For example, Gompers of the AFL saw 
the war as an opportunity to gain respectability and achieve employer concessions such as the 
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eight-hour workday, 20 percent wage increases, welfare pensions, the formation of personnel 
departments, and union recognition. 140 
The IWW, in contrast, maintained its dedication to radical social change at a cost. As one 
of the only labor organizations to publically oppose the war, the union bore the brunt of wartime 
measures to suppress dissent. Preston writes: 
In the wartime hysteria of 1917, Americans were in no mood to accept reasonable 
interpretations of the inflammatory and incendiary prose by which the IWW had lived.... 
By emphasizing the continuing war with the master class and by refusing to abandon the 
right to strike, the IWW retained the very concepts that were to ensure its suppression.141 
Accordingly, President Woodrow Wilson sent federal troops to break up IWW strikes in 
Washington State and Montana and the Wobbly leadership was decimated when over 165 of its 
leaders faced federal prosecution under the Espionage Act of 1917. The Sedition Act of 1918, 
moreover, made it a crime to write, publish or even talk about the armed forces, flag, constitution 
or government in a negative way. Legal repression also encouraged vigilantes to attack or kill 
scores of Wobblies with impunity.142  
The end of the war brought no reprise as what would become known as the First Red 
Scare ushered in a period of widespread fear of and repression towards communists, anarchists, 
immigrants, and radicalism in general. Spurred by increased labor unrest and fears of the Russian 
Bolshevik Revolution spreading to shores of the United States, some communities banned books 
and required loyalty oaths from teachers, while twenty-eight states enacted anti-sedition laws. 
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Thousands of radicals and immigrants were arrested or deported, or even killed between 1919 
and 1920 and the IWW was, for all intents and purposes, destroyed.143 
Historian Gabriel Kolko also points to government repression as a cause of the failure the 
American Socialist Party in the article “The Decline of American Radicalism in the Twentieth 
Century (1966),” for Studies on the Left. Following WWI, “at the very moment American 
socialism appeared on the verge of significant organization and success,” wrote Kolko, “it was 
attacked by the combined resources of the Federal and various state governments.”144 During the 
war over one-third of the Party’s ranks had faced arrest. Eugene V. Debs. Debs, the outspoken 
labor leader and perennial Socialist candidate for president, had to run his fifth national 
campaign from inside a federal prison, after publicly denouncing the war and facing prosecution 
under the Espionage Act. After the war the government suppression of Socialists continued, even 
resulting in the expulsion of five democratically elected Socialist members of the New York 
Assembly in 1920. 
James R. Green, Professor of History and Labor Studies, argued in Grass-Roots 
Socialism: Radical Movements in the Southwest 1895-1943 (1978) that despite initial success, 
the repression of the socialist parties of the U.S. West and Midwest was a chief cause of their 
decline: 
The unsuccessful efforts made by… other groups to oppose the draft led to widespread 
repression of the Socialist party and the IWW… And these abortive direct actions 
hastened the repression of the entire left in the Southwest…government officials 
possessed the legal authority to suppress radicalism. They used this authority quite 
effectively in 1917 and 1918 to destroy the Socialist movement throughout the West and 
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Midwest… The passage of criminal syndicalism laws and the raids connected with the 
1919 Red Scare wiped out the last pockets of radical resistance…145 
Green’s point that the government repression of World War I radicals used “patriotism as a 
pretext” had particular relevance for New Left scholars who identified with anti-war protest 
during the height of the Vietnam War.  
 British author and historian, David Caute, expanded this argument to include the 
repression of radicals during the 1950s. During the Second Red Scare the FBI processed more 
than five million loyalty oaths and Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin and the House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC) initiated congressional hearings on possible communist 
infiltration of society. Dissidents, moreover, could face federal prosecution under 
The Alien Registration Act of 1940 (aka the Smith Act) or The Internal Security Act of 1950 
(aka the McCarran Act), which outlawed any organization advocating the violent overthrow of 
the State, and put limitations on the rights Communists, effectively outlawing the CPSUA. By 
the end of the decade, thousands of suspected radicals had been wiretapped, surveilled, 
interrogated, blackmailed, indicted, or imprisoned.146  
Claiming that government suppression prevented socialism not only freed New Left 
scholars from the burden of an all-encompassing, inhospitable U.S. ethos, but took the blame off 
activists themselves. In this scenario radicals in the United States simply faced an adversary 
more powerful than they were. This explanation also had the added bonus of highlighting the 
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historical injustices of the U.S. federal government, a tactic that helped activist scholars 
demonstrate parallels to modern struggles in the effort to garner support.  
 Historian John Laslett has acknowledged the importance of the “long history of 
repressive acts undertaken against radicals and Marxists” in curbing U.S. socialism but points to 
the contradiction that other countries with sizeable labor movements have experienced as much 
repression, if not more. In the United States, notes Laslett, “repression of radical movements has 
not taken the form of deliberate murder or destruction as often as it has in a number of European 
countries.” Yet Laslett reconciles this observation with the proposal that the U.S. socialist 
movement was more susceptible to repression than European counterparts because of larger 
societal forces: 
I would suggest that part of the explanation is to be found in the fact that where you have 
a highly stratified society in which crucial elements of either the peasantry or the 
proletariat are already predisposed against constituted authority and at a time of crisis are 
willing to follow class leaders or otherwise to act in a class way, then repression simply 
drives the movement underground, from where it will reemerge, strengthened, at a 
suitable moment. On the other hand, if you have a society in which either the agrarian 
element or the urban working class lacks any coherent sense of class loyalty and is 
predisposed toward acculturation or assimilation, as in the United States, then repression 
will have the opposite effect. Instead of nourishing rebellion, in other words, it will 
induce its followers to draw back from any fundamental challenge to the society, and to 
accept their pace instead in what may continue to be an unjust social system. 147 
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V. 
 
 While repression made for an appealing excuse for the failure of socialism in the United 
States, scholars like Laslett did not lay the entirety of the blame on that issue alone. An even 
greater factor pointed out by Melvyn Dubofsky was the ability of U.S. corporate managers and 
the political system to absorb radicalism. Referring to the IWW, Dubofsky suggested the 
following: 
Unlike radicals in other societies who contended with established orders unresponsive to 
lower-class discontent and impervious to change from within, the Wobblies struggled 
against flexible and sophisticated adversaries… Whatever success the Wobblies achieved 
only stimulated the reform process, for employers who were threatened by the IWW paid 
greater attention to labor relations, and government agencies, initially called upon to 
repress labor strife, encouraged employers to improve working conditions. While IWW 
leaders felt repression during World War I, their followers enjoyed eight-hour days, 
grievance boards, and company unions. Put more simply, reform finally proved a better 
method than repression for weakening the IWW’s appeal to workers.148 
 Much like socialist politician Morris Hillquit who suggested the same theory a half-
century earlier, many New Left scholars saw great efficacy in this proposition. As activists 
struggled to reform society in the 1960s and 1970s, they too faced what they saw as “flexible and 
sophisticated adversaries,” in a democratic establishment that practiced the art of co-optation. 
First, the goal of racial justice had been addressed by President Lyndon Johnson is the landmark 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965. Next, class issues became a concern of 
the administration through the set of domestic programs designed to alleviate poverty and 
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promote a social welfare safety net known as the Great Society, through Medicare Medicaid and 
aid to cities, college students and pubic schooling. Even the Vietnam War, which had been 
central to the foreign policy of the Democrats, was coopted by the time Senator George 
McGovern ran as a “peace” candidate for President in 1972, before Richard Nixon arranged a 
withdrawal of all combat troops from the war months later. 
 In similar fashion, John Laslett attributed the Socialist Party’s decline in large part to the 
loss of union support triggered by Wilsonian progressive reforms between 1913 and 1916: 
Once President Wilson had been elected, and had begun to enact the series of social 
reforms for which his first administration became famous (the Clayton Act, the La 
Follette Seamen’s Act, the establishment of a Department of Labor, and so on), virtually 
all of the unions considered in this sample began immediately to turn away from their 
earlier political support of the Socialist party, and to align themselves with the 
Democrats.149 
Mike Davis pursued a similar line of reasoning, but put the foci in a later period by 
asserting that President Franklin Roosevelt neutralized labor and radicalism. Davis argued that 
the ‘leftward’ turn of the New Deal in 1935 through measures such as the Social Security Act, 
the Works Progress Administration, and the Wagner National Labor Relations Act “stole the 
thunder and coopted the popular raison d’être of the insurgent political movements.” This was 
particularly true of Roosevelt’s treatment of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The 
CIO, a spin-off from the AFL, was much more progressive in that it organized regardless of craft 
or race but much less radical than previous industrial unions like the IWW. Although the CIO 
did not advocate revolution it practiced social unionism, which advocated that workers were 
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patriotic consumers and what was good for them was good for everyone. The union’s agenda 
included higher wages, seniority rights, grievance procedures, civil rights, health insurance, and 
full employment but accepted the basic capitalist structure of the economy.150  
By supporting the CIO, Roosevelt gained the support of labor. Davis explains that 
contrary to the strikebreaking of President Grover Cleveland and Wilson, Roosevelt’s tacit 
support for the CIO’s sit-down strike in 1936–37 “allowed him to appear as the saviour of 
industrial unionism.” However, Davis also claims that the “shrewdness of Roosevelt’s strategy” 
not only attained labor’s support, but that “the broad reforms” of FDR’s “Second New Deal” 
constituted a “powerful gravitational force which attracted contemporary radicalism much closer 
to the orbit of the Democratic Party.” By 1940, 10 percent to one-fourth of the CIO’s leadership 
were Communist activists. Roosevelt managed to funnel would-be radicals into the more 
acceptable CIO and the New Deal Coalition, cutting the strength out from under a broad class 
based movement.151 
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PART FOUR: The End of History and the End of Exceptionalism 
Cultural Studies, Neoconservatives and Socialism’s Plight, 1970s-2000s 
 
As New Left historiography peaked with the end of the Vietnam War in 1973, a New 
Social History was increasingly focused on culture. Combining the New Left’s attention to 
ordinary people with the Consensus school’s desire for an overarching ethos, the “Cultural Turn” 
led to examinations of institutions and systems and how they influence the way people construct 
their identities and make sense of their world. Such an approach has implications for studying the 
degree of radicalism in the United States. “Why can’t there be socialism in the United States?” 
some scholars asked.  
At the same time the country was experiencing a backlash against the remnants of the 
New Left. This rightward shift changed the nation politically as well as academically. 
Mainstream scholarship on the alleged failures of radicalism took an increasingly congratulatory 
tone, citing the success of capitalism as the most prevalent reason for the collapse of socialism.  
The end of the Cold War and a period of relative stability and prosperity in the early 1990s led 
Neoconservative scholars to proudly declare the end of history and a restatement of American 
Exceptionalism. “There can be no socialism in the United States!” they seemed to say. 
 
I. 
 
An important legacy of New Left scholarship conveyed disenchantment with the U.S. 
political system, and the belief that real progress was impossible through the established order. 
This led to an examination of whether the nature of the political system in the United States was 
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particularly inhospitable to radicalism. Such disillusionment, however, proceeded beyond 
politics to new fields of academia that questioned the very concepts of rationality in human 
affairs and the efficacy of political programs. Much of this scholarship emerged in response to 
the white backlash against forced busing, open housing, and urban disorder in the form of inner 
city race riots that emerged during the later stages of the Great Society. For its opponents like 
George Wallace, the Alabama Governor and pro-segregation presidential hopeful, and Ronald 
Reagan, the Republican, anti-radical governor of California who would be elected president in 
1980, civil rights legislation seemed to be an overextension of government power favoring 
blacks at the expense of whites. This aversion to the welfare state, defense of limited 
government, opposition to the civil rights agenda, and animosity to the counterculture and 
militant blacks began to erode the once strong New Deal Coalition of the Democratic Party.  
As the public turned against both liberalism and radicalism, so did much of the working 
class the New Left was seeking to emancipate. The youth-oriented antiwar movement was 
garnered resentment for its disruptions and disrespect for authority, particularly when many 
activists came from elite universities and were exempt from the draft. There were even examples 
of violent reprisals, like the “Hard Hat Riot” of 1970, where two-hundred construction workers 
mobilized by the AFL-CIO attacked a group of college protesters in Lower Manhattan, resulting 
in seventy injuries and six arrests. Many in the U.S. working class saw the elites in Washington 
D.C., on college campuses, and in the media as looking down their noses at ordinary people. And 
when the Vietnam War finally did end with the Nixon administrations withdrawal of combat 
forces in 1973, the activist New Left lost the major issue that had united its disparate forces. 
With the collapse of New Left hopes, its supporters in academia abandoned their quest 
for a usable past. In 1979, New Left Sociologist Charles Leinenweber, reflecting back on his 
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earlier work, acknowledged, “the practical aspect is less interesting to us now, since the 
movements of the 1960s have long subsided and no new ones have arisen to take their place.”152 
At the same time, New Left’s focus on “history from the bottom up” had inspired an 
outpouring of scholarship on slavery and other issues that emphasized the role of African-
American agency.153 The proliferation of scholarship on Black History, combined with the 
formation of Black or African-American Studies, offered fresh perspectives on the failure of 
socialism in the United States. Sally Miller, a professor of social sciences, argued in the Journal 
of Negro History in 1971 that the Socialist Party “undertook no meaningful struggle against 
second-class citizenship,” and this helped to explain its failure. The Socialist focus on class 
consciousness, contended Miller, often ignored other factors such as race:  
The Negro might be noticed by the part in his economic role as a worker, but he was not 
seen to be a worker with peculiar difficulties imposed by the existing semi-caste system. 
Marxist ideology, instead of leading Socialists to seek out the Negro as the worker with 
absolutely nothing to lose but his chains, reinforced the existing national tendency to 
overlook his comprehensive exploitation.154 
Even if the Socialist Party had reached out to the African-American community, Miller 
insisted, it was “unlikely that a fruitful relationship would have evolved.” Despite the existence 
of Black socialist leaders like A. Philip Randolph and Chandler Owen, the majority of the black 
community “demonstrated very little interest in the abolition of capitalism. What he wanted was 
his opportunity to prosper within that system.”155  
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Another academic shift in the 1970s and 1980s that influenced the way scholars 
addressed the absence of U.S. socialism involved the increased attention paid to the lives of 
women. Women’s Studies arose from both the New Left legacy of emphasizing the experience 
of ordinary people and the resurgence of a strong women’s rights movement in the United States 
in the 1970s addressed reproductive rights, domestic violence, sexual harassment, sexual 
violence, and economic, political, and social discrimination. Works such as Sheila Rothman’s 
Woman’s Proper Place: A History of Changing Ideals and Practices, 1870 to the Present (1978), 
and Mary Beth Norton’s Liberty’s Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American 
Women, 1750-1800 (1980), tried to focus on the experiences of ordinary women, as opposed to 
only focusing on the "Great Women," of the past.156  
Like African American Studies, Women Studies breathed fresh air into the study of U.S. 
socialism. Sally Miller, for example, argued that another important factor that contributed to the 
downfall of the Socialist Party was its failure in fully harnessing the potential power of women. 
Miller pointed out how there were numerous instances of overlap between women’s rights 
issues, such as literacy, temperance, women’s labor and suffrage, and the Socialist program. And 
unlike the dominant political parties, she noted, the Socialists had a relatively large female 
contingent that made up over a tenth of the party’s membership and played a large role in its 
abilities:  
Women served the party as organizers, propagandists, pamphleteers, and candidates for 
public office. In 1912, the party sent sixty speakers throughout North America on a 
lyceum circuit, and over one-fifth of these were women. Party journalists were women 
almost as often as men, with copy editors and staff people tending to be women. 
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Autonomous women’s socialist study groups… coordinated their programs and their 
lobbying around party initiatives. Women party members raised funds for strike benefits 
and campaign expenses, distributed propaganda, served as poll watchers, established and 
taught socialist Sunday schools and in general, built bridges to nonsocialist women and 
women’s organizations. 157 
Despite such involvement, Miller argued, the political leadership of the Socialist party, 
dominated by patriarchal white men, insisted on keeping the struggle for women’s rights separate 
and the women’s groups detached and subordinate to the national organization. “Party treatment 
of the so-called Woman Question and of women members often seemed perfunctory, more lip 
service than genuine commitment,” she noted.158 In the end, she concludes, the socialist 
movement suffered from such exclusion.  
 
II. 
 
While social history thrived in the new subfields of women’s and African-American 
studies, the topic of culture emerged as a major area of scholarly focus. The “cultural turn” was 
inspired by works like Hayden White’s Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-
Century Europe (1973), Clifford Geertz’s The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays 
(1973), Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of Prison (1977), and Pierre 
Bourdieu’s Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977).159 The new interdisciplinary field of Cultural 
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Studies drew its inspiration from the concepts of cultural anthropology, post-structuralism, and 
linguistic analysis to examine the way humans explain and assign meaning to their experiences 
in the world through cultural constructs, such as language or systems of representation.160 
Cultural studies insists that culture must be viewed within the social relations and system through 
which it is produced and consumed, and is intimately bound up with the assessment of society, 
politics, and economics. U.S. culture and society, in other words, is a contested terrain with 
various groups and ideologies struggling for control.161  
U.S. scholars such as sociologists Charles Leinenweber, John Alt, Stanley Aronowitz, 
and historian Lawrence Goodwyn applied this new emphasis on culture to their understanding of 
U.S. radicalism and its shortcomings using the concepts of Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci was an 
Italian writer, politician, political theorist, philosopher, sociologist, linguist, and founding 
member of the Italian Communist Party in the interwar period until his imprisonment by Benito 
Mussolini’s Fascist regime. After his death, his work gained prestige by moving Marxism 
beyond economic issues with his concept of cultural hegemony, which describes how the ruling 
class uses cultural norms and ideology to maintain power in capitalist societies.162 Borrowing 
this notion, John Alt, a scholar of sociology and anthropology, outlined a framework of “Liberal 
hegemony,” in his article for the journal Telos, “Beyond Class: The Decline of Industrial Labor 
and Leisure (1973),” in which the the working class is transformed into the consuming class and 
neutered its revolutionary potential 
One of the great social and cultural transformations of the twentieth century is the 
historical shift from the primacy of labor to that of consumption—the mediation of social 
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relations and consciousness by consumer goods. This relatively recent phenomenon 
eclipses the class experience of wage-labor and raises commodity fetishism to a new 
form of domination: from extensive exploitation and misery (wage-labor), to reduced 
work time (leisure) and increased material comforts (consumerism). Integrated by 
increased leisure and higher wages, modern employees are culturally and politically 
dislodged from the world of work and from a class experience in the traditional Marxian 
sense. Concerned primarily with the immediate gratifications of familial intimacy and 
consumerism, they come to tolerate the exploitation of labor and even political 
authoritarianism so long as the system sustains a rising standard of living.163 
 If “working-class culture,” the true driver of revolution, derived from the shared 
experiences of material conditions, the dominance of capitalist hegemony had eliminated that 
culture, radical theorists suggested. Social life, according to labor historian Stanley Aronowitz, 
“is no longer organized around the common relation to the production of both culture and 
commodities. The working class public sphere is dead.” 
Social historian Eric Foner explored the implications of this perspective. “The seedbed of 
socialist politics is a counter-hegemonic set of cultural institutions, rather than the polity or the 
work place.”164 In this model, culture became important to radicals through the formation of 
“counter-cultures” that allowed the development of the revolutionary spirit. Lawrence 
Goodwyn’s Democratic Promise: The Populist Movement in America (1976) illustrated the 
necessity of countercultures through a history of the Texas branch of the People’s Party in the 
late nineteenth century. The shared struggles of farmers produced what Goodwyn termed an 
"Alliance culture" where experiences became shared understandings, expectations, and values: 
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The cooperative movement led to political education in terms of farmer-merchant, 
farmer-creditor, and farmer-shipper relations and ... such education led to the ... 
energizing self-perception of the farmer's subordinate place in the industrial 
society…only the cooperative experience over a period of time provided the kind of 
education that imparted to the political movement the specific form and substance of the 
greenback heritage.165 
This alliance culture is what gave the Populist their strength. However, as the movement grew it 
lost much of its cooperative features. The national movement tried to reproduce it, but without 
the actual shared experiences, it became a cheap imitation of the original. By the time the 
Populists backed Democrat William Jennings Bryan for president in 1896, the party had become 
"virtually issueless," Goodwyn argued, and "represented little more than a quest for honorable 
men who would pledge themselves to forsake corrupt practices."166  
A surprising result of the historiographical cultural turn was that it was, in a way, 
reviving the “ethos” Consensus argument. Once again, one of the central concerns of cultural 
scholars became the values of radicals and how they conformed to or diverged from the 
dominant value system of the working class and the rest of society. Reviving the debate of 
Consensus scholars Adolph Sturmthal and Marc Karson, authors such as social and literary critic 
Irving Howe, and historian David DeLeon argued that the people of the United States were more 
independent than their counterparts in Europe.  
DeLeon pointed out in The American as Anarchist: Reflections on Indigenous Radicalism 
(1978), how U.S. radicals have been prone to anti-statism. Whereas European radical movements 
such as Scandinavian social democracy, Fabian bureaucratic socialism, and Soviet communism 
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all entailed a high degree of state collectivism, U.S. radicals have been wary of centralization. 
This has surfaced on both the extreme right, leaning towards libertarianism, as well as the left, 
elements of which favor some form of anarchy or syndicalism.167 “American exceptionalism,” 
Irving Howe notes in Socialism and America (1985), “has often taken the guise of querulous 
anti-statism… It can veer toward an American version of anarchism, suspicious of all laws form, 
and regulations… Tilt toward the right and you have the moralism of American reformers.”168 
Specific examples of this can been seen in U.S. history. Historian Nick Salvatore in his 
biography Eugene V. Debs: Citizen and Socialist (1982) defended the perennial socialist 
presidential candidate when he lamented "the task of affirming a collective identity in a culture 
that boasted of its individualistic mores."169 Historian William M. Dick, exploring Labor and 
Socialism in America (1972), looked at the individualism of the U.S. labor movement and argued 
that for much of its first half century, the AFL was in fact syndicalist, or advocated for worker-
controlled industries. Gompers even described himself as “three-quarters anarchist.” And its 
radical competitor, the IWW, went even farther and advocated anarcho-syndicalism, or the 
proposed co-operative organization of society into a revolutionary, decentralized collection of 
industrial worker syndicates. For a time, according to Dick, both regarded the state, as much as 
private industry, as the enemy, and advocated for worker-controlled economy.170 
 Even the New Left evolved from anti-statist values, according to sociologist Richard 
Flacks. One of the founders of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), a major student activist 
movement of the 1960s, Flacks wrote in the 1990s, 
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The dominant spirit of the 60s was neither social-democratic nor statist/Stalinist/Leninist, 
but owed more to anarchist/pacifist/radical democratic traditions: Students and workers 
should claim voice in the institutions they inhabit; communities and neighborhoods 
should have democratic control over their futures; co-ops, communes, and collectives 
should be the places to try alternative futures and practice authentic vocation… Here in 
short was a thoroughgoing critique of statism, advanced not by the right but by young 
Black and White activist/intellectuals devoted to a decentralizing, devolutionary, radical-
democratic politics.171 
 Scholars such as Gordon Wood in The Creation of the American Republic: 1776-1787 
(1969), and J.G.A. Pocock in The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition (1975), speculated that the anti-statist value-system stemmed from 
the small producer values of preindustrial United States. Unlike the Consensus academics who 
emphasized the persistence of liberalism, these scholars contended that classic republicanism had 
a greater influence on the nascent nation. Republican values such as popular sovereignty, 
hostility to large accumulations of property, and the importance of industrial enterprise as the 
bedrocks of an autonomous citizenry, they argued, created a small producer, artisan rural culture 
which in turn produced an anti-statist tradition, even in U.S. radicals. 172 
  
III. 
 
The cultural turn brought previously unstudied aspects of popular culture to the forefront 
of academia. Works such as Burton J. Bledstein’s The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle 
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Class and the Development of Higher Education in America (1976) and David F. Noble’s 
America by Design: Science, Technology and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism (1977) explored 
the effects of the institutional and cultural transformation of the emergence of the professional-
managerial class in corporate America.173 Barbara and John Ehrenreich used this new focus to 
explain U.S. radicalism in an article in Radical America entitled “The New Left and the 
Professional Managerial Class (1977).” The Ehrenreichs contend that a two-class method, where 
everyone is in the proletariat except for a tiny ruling class, is not useful to explain the United 
States, and needs to be updated to include the large and important professional sector that lie 
between them. The fact that many of the nation’s radicals have come from this professional-
managerial class, they argued, reduces the revolutionary potential of the United States. 
According to this view, the managerial class serves to reduce class consciousness by absorbing a 
certain percentage of the working-class and acts as a buffer by deflecting conflict away from the 
capitalist class: 
…the very existence of the PMC (professional-managerial class) is predicated on the 
atomization of working-class life and culture and the appropriation of skill once vested in 
the working class. The activities which the PMC performs within the capitalist division of 
labor in themselves serve to undermine positive class consciousness among the working 
class. The kind of consciousness which remains, the commonly held attitudes of the 
working class, are as likely to be anti-PMC as they are to be anti-capitalist – if only 
because people are more likely, in a day-to-day sense, to experience humiliation, 
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harassment, frustration, etc. at the hands of the PMC than from members of the actual 
capitalist class. 174 
 Ethnic studies was another academic specialty transformed by the infusion of cultural 
parameters. Historian of immigration Rudolph Vecoli argued against the notion that immigrants 
to the United States left their cultures behind. Instead Vecoli insisted that immigrants clung to 
their traditions and developed strategies to retain their heritage and defy pressures to assimilate 
into the U.S. social and economic system. It was this cultural aspect that, Vecoli asserted, made 
immigrants unsusceptible to the appeals of socialism: 
More important than the ‘material conditions of American capitalism’ in determining the 
politics of ethnic groups appears to have been a calculus of cultural influences. Religion, 
nationalism, and radicalism competed for the loyalty of the immigrants…  religio-
nationalistic identity proved to be highly resistant to the radical virus. Among the 
Catholic and Slavic immigrants, such as the Poles and Slovaks, the socialist appeal, 
regardless of the horrors of the steel mills and the packing houses, went largely unheeded. 
Even among the radicals, the predominance of patriotism over internationalism was 
conclusively demonstrated during the First World War. Following the outbreak of 
hostilities, many socialists, especially those from subject nationalities of Eastern Europe, 
rallied to the cause of national independence.175 
Charles Leinenweber also acknowledged the importance of the cultural turn in the 
investigations of ethnic and class history. “Cultural investigations of class formation stand as our 
greatest achievement so far in developing a social history of twentieth-century working-class 
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America,” noted Leinenweber. However, he pointed out “there are serious problems with this 
cultural approach, which by now dominates historical thinking on the working class: 
It attempts to leap past the tedious nuts-and-bolts work of building a literature on the 
material conditions surrounding American working-class development simply by 
asserting that they aren’t very important… Yet even as this approach claims a distinction 
between culture and material conditions, it smuggles material factors back in as 
cultural… Practically speaking, culture and material conditions don’t separate for the 
very good reason that values, traditions, and institutions depend on certain material 
circumstances for their flourishing. 176 
 
IV. 
 
The academic focus on culture and diversity led to the academic doctrine of 
Multiculturalism, or the preservation and exploration of diverse cultures or cultural identities. 
Universalism was replaced with relativity, while inclusion and diversity became the creed of the 
day. Meanwhile, a conservative backlash emerged in the United States against the remnants of 
New Left activism. In 1991 sociologist James Davidson Hunter coined the term “Culture Wars,” 
to describe the United States of the 1980s and 1990s. Society, according to Hunter, was split on 
ideological lines across a number of “hot-button” issues such as abortion, gun control, separation 
of church and state, privacy, homosexuality, and censorship. The United States had gone from an 
increasingly fragmented society of the 1970s to a polarized one by the 1990s. These conflicts had 
been growing since the collapse of the New Deal electoral coalition in the 1970s, which set the 
stage for the “Reagan Revolution” of the 1980s, during which the nation experienced a rightward 
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shift under President Ronald Reagan’s supply-side economics policies, austerity plans, anti-
communist rhetoric, and hostility to unions.177 
A concurrent movement in the academic and intellectual sphere replicated the 
“Neoconservative” drift in U.S. politics, influencing the way scholars addressed the absence of 
socialism in the United States. Aileen Kraditor, a New Left Historian turned Neoconservative, 
used a conservative perspective to elucidate her views on U.S. radicalism. In The Radical 
Persuasion, 1890-1917: Aspects of the Intellectual History and the Historiography of Three 
American Radical Organizations (1981), Kraditor pointed to the prevalence of values that 
workers held over tradition, ethnicity, community, religion, and family that made radicalism 
unappealing to the average person. Beyond the prevalence of traditional values, Kraditor 
contended that workers in the early twentieth were able to carve out independent enclaves where 
they could live their lives according to these beliefs in a certain degree of autonomy: 
The millions of anonymous John Q. Workers who went to work every day and went home to their 
families every night and could never see the radicals' ideology as a better explanation for their 
lives than the ones that they subscribed to and that made their experiences meaningful to them178 
In addition to attributing traditional values and identification with small communities to 
U.S. workers, Kraditor also laid blame on radicals themselves. The I.W.W., the Socialist Labor 
Party, and the Socialist Party were all guilty of foolish and incorrect strategies, she maintained, 
based on a false view of workers in the United States. This was because their theories "had been 
formulated aprioristically.... It was the gap between the abstraction they called the Worker and 
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the real John Q. Worker that, in the final analysis, defeated them."179 Radical scholars, 
admonished Kraditor, treat “John Q. Worker's life and belief system as having had no meaning 
other than in relation to capitalist oppression and the historically assigned mission to destroy 
it.”180 
A similar take on the failure of U.S. socialism characterized the work of American 
Studies Professor James Nuechterlein, who simply suggested that U.S. capitalism was better, and 
therefore won. Nuechterlein traced this reading to Werner Sombart’s affluence and social 
mobility theses. Yet radical historians refused to accept this. “Rather than ponder the obvious,” 
he contended,  
Radicals prefer to take refuge in the obfuscations of “false consciousness.” The people 
may choose, but they do not choose well, bemused as they are by the encompassing 
“hegemonic” values of bourgeois culture.  
Not only is this interpretation wrong, Nuechterlein claimed, but it also robbed workers of 
agency: 
If, however, we free ourselves from obscurantist categories and begin to address on their 
own terms the decisions made by people in the past, we might obtain a less 
condescending view of working-class consciousness. We might see that most workers 
and their families, recognizing instinctively the limits and trade-offs all social systems 
impose, sensed that life within the American industrial system, for all its burden offered 
them more than did any realistic alternative… 
Nuechterlein insisted that radical scholars treated workers as fools. However, if they took 
a moment to consider the benefits of capitalism, he suggested, workers could be viewed as not 
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misled, but making a conscious decision to participate in the system that provided them the 
highest likelihood of benefit. And the benefits were indeed tangible: 
As Stephan Thernstrum and others have reminded us, that rags-to respectability was a 
real possibility. In that sense, the American Dream was not a fraud; social mobility did 
exist, as did rising real wages. So also the political system… offered more participation, 
more accessibility, more responsiveness to the concerns of people like themselves than 
did that of any other country. 181 
Nuechterlein’s emphasis on the success of U.S. capitalism was unsurprisingly popular 
with many neo-conservative thinkers. And this victorious attitude was seemingly vindicated as 
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 triggered the collapse of worldwide Communism and 
signaled the apparent supremacy of U.S capitalism. U.S. political scientist Francis Fukuyama 
summed it up as the “end of history.” The worldwide struggles had been decided and now 
Western liberal capitalist democracies would spread across the globe as the endpoint of 
humanity’s sociocultural evolution.182 
The end of the Cold War seemed to herald the ostensible defeat of radicalism just as a 
conservative turn had shifted the U.S. political landscape to the right. The once menacing specter 
of socialism now seemed ridiculous or puerile. The question of why it had failed began to fade 
out of view. And when it was approached it often times took a regretful lament.  
Historian Mark Pittenger’s 1993 intellectual history of socialist movements in the United 
States, American Socialists and Evolutionary Thought: 1870-1920, argued that nineteenth 
century evolutionism had affected socialist thought. Evolutionist principles had supplanted 
theoretical Marxism, contended Pittenger, leading U.S socialists to accept the gradual, seemingly 
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inevitable evolution of society through reform. Evolutionary thought also explained why U.S. 
socialists were not as critical of racism, sexism, and nativism, as they could have been.183 Brian 
Lloyd's Left Out: Pragmatism, Exceptionalism, and the Poverty of American Marxism (1997), 
pursued the same line but insisted that during and after Debs, Socialists relied too heavily on 
experience and pragmatism. This moderate version of U.S. socialism supposedly watered down 
Marxist principles to the point where they were no more significant than the reformism of the 
Progressives. 184 
These accounts have an unmistakable tinge of regret for what might have been. Both 
Pittenger and Lloyd accuse the socialists of having played it too safe and been defeated as a 
result. Reflecting his disappointment with the collapse of the left in contemporary United States 
and a cynical view of political movements, Lloyd wrote that,  
No matter how patiently it was awaited or urgently it was summoned, no natural agent of 
revolution emerged from the cauldron of modern industry. Trade unionism has never, of 
its own volition, transmuted into anti-capitalism; no electoral socialist, on either side of 
the Atlantic, has used a bourgeois state to dismantle capitalism.185 
The rest of the explanations around the turn of the millennium took the form of self-
congratulatory vindications. Consensus era political Scientist Seymour Lipset’s essay “The End 
of Exceptionalism?” proclaimed that not only did U.S. capitalism’s benefits outweigh 
socialism’s, but it also did a better job at achieving socialism’s goals than socialism ever could. 
The United States, Lipset claimed, “is closer to their ideological goal of a socially classless and 
weak state society than any system they knew in their lifetime.” Repeating Samson’s line from 
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the 1930s, he noted, “American radicals were unable to sell socialism to a people who believed 
they already lived in a society which operationally, though not terminologically, was committed 
to egalitarian objectives.”186 
The United States’ victory not only ended the Cold War, Lispet argued, but ended 
American Exceptionalism as well. “No major tendency, left or right, retains a belief in a utopia, 
in a solution for all major problems by dramatically reconstructing society and polity… The 
United States is no longer as exceptional politically.”187 This was not because the United States 
had lost anything, but because it had remade the world over in its image. Lipset’s consensus had 
once again returned. And this time it was worldwide. There was now no socialism anywhere. 
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CONCLUSION 
  
For over a century the Question “Why is there no socialism in the United States” has 
plagued thinkers both revolutionary and reactionary. But for all the effort put into it, are we 
really any closer to finding an answer? The responses have ranged from consideration of U.S. 
extremism to notions of U.S. passivity, from political freedom in the United States to its crushing 
repression, from the failure to tap the treasure trove of potential in The United States’ immigrant 
or working class populations to radical movements dragged down by the conservatism of those 
same groups.  
Often times if a question has no clear answer, it is because we have been asking the 
wrong question. Agreeing with this sentiment, Eric Foner has suggested a reexamination of the 
way we approach the absence of U.S. socialism. Scholars generally are not actually asking “why 
is America not a socialist nation?” or even “why is there no major socialist party in the United 
States?” contends Foner. In realty they are simply asking why does the United States not have 
more of a working class consciousness or labor-based party like the ones in Western Europe. Yet 
after examining the movements of Western Europe, Foner concludes that they too have been 
“incapable of using their impressive political strength to reshape fundamentally their societies:” 
They have, one might say, promoted liberalism and egalitarianism more successfully than 
socialism, and presented themselves as the proponents of modernization and social rationalization 
rather than class rule, thus operating in way more analogous to American political parties than 
either Americans or Europeans would care to admit.188 
Akin to Seymour Lipset’s conclusion, New Left social historian Eric Foner suggests that 
rather than lagging behind Europe, perhaps it is as Marx put it so many decades ago, “the 
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country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its 
own future” In other words the U.S. system may hold the key to the future: 
Perhaps, because mass politics, mass culture, and mass consumption came to America 
before it did to Europe, American socialist were the first to face the dilemma of how to 
define socialist politics in a capitalist democracy. Perhaps, in the dissipation of class 
ideologies, Europe is now catching up with a historical process already experienced in the 
United States… Only time will tell whether the United States has been behind Europe in 
the development of socialism, or ahead of it, in socialism’s decline. 189   
Unlike Foner, economic and intellectual historian James Livingston posits that perhaps 
the question is not “why is there no socialism in the United States?” but rather, “why is there still 
socialism in the United States?” Livingston pointed out in The World Turned Inside Out: 
American Thought and Culture at the End of the 20th Century (2009), that even after the Reagan 
revolution and the rightward shift of the nation, there was still a “dizzying range of regulatory 
agencies, federal statues, and executive orders which, then as now, limit the reach of the market” 
as well as “thousands of nongovernmental organizations and nonprofit institutions that stand 
athwart the free market, modulating and containing its arbitrary forces.”190 Behind the rhetoric, 
insisted Livingston, the United States was still devoted in many ways to a welfare state, the 
ultimate expression of the desire for economic egalitarianism.  
Even U.S. culture, Livingston suggests “was much more liberal, open, and electric in 
1990 than in 1980, and then again in 2000, no matter how you frame the issues of gender, 
sexuality, and race, no matter how you characterize music, movies, and other performance 
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arts.”191  Historian and writer Michael Kazin goes even further, in American Dreamers: How the 
Left Changed a Nation (2011), by claiming that, in a way, socialism has succeeded. Though the 
left had failed to produce a sweeping political program, he argues, it had succeeded in 
transforming society through altering and redefining its “moral culture.” Kazin claims that the 
left can claim victory for bending the political discourse of the nation towards justice and is 
directly responsible for the contemporary movements for gay rights, eco-sustainability, civil 
rights, and social justice. 192 
When looked at from this perspective, the discord over U.S. radicalism becomes 
understandable, as we can see that, in fact, scholars have not even all been asking the same 
question. Each exploration of the topic is really asking an entirely different question. The early 
socialists were asking, “When will there be socialism?” while the Progressives asked, “How can 
there be no socialism?” During the Consensus Era it was, “Why, thank God, is there no 
socialism?” and for the New Left it was either “Why, Goddammit, is there no socialism?” or 
“How can there be socialism?” The Cultural Studies scholars asked, “Why can’t there be 
socialism?” and the Neoconservatives proudly declared, “There can be socialism!”  
 Instead of Seymour Lipset’s assessment that we have moved beyond American 
Exceptionalism to a new worldwide consensus, it is more likely that Lipset offers us a particular 
point of view from a particular vantage point. Writing at the turn of the 21st century, there was 
much to be hopeful for. The United States emerged from the Cold War as the solitary undisputed 
superpower. Its economy remained the most productive in the world and was spurred along even 
further by the technological and communications boom following the invention of the World 
Wide Web. “These post Cold War conditions,” boasted a hopeful Lispet, 
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bode well for democratic stability and for international peace. It has become an 
undocumented truism that democracies do not wage war against each other and most of 
the world is now democratic. While extremist movements and parties exist, all of them 
are weak…193 
As is often is the case, however, just when peace and stability finally seemed within 
grasp, they slip through the cracks. In the United States, the new millennium started with a 
recession resulting from the collapse of the dotcom bubble, followed shortly by the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th, 2001. The ensuing decade witnessed wars, terrorism, and instances of 
U.S. initiated torture, which split the political and social fabric of the country to levels unheard 
of since the 1960s. The collapse of the housing market in 2008 then brought about the Great 
Recession as the economic stability of millions of people in the United States was thrown into 
doubt.  
As the nation’s youth entered the worst job market since the 1930s, with levels of student 
debt at unprecedentedly high levels, some young people began to reconsider the utopian claims 
surrounding capitalism. This leftward turn found expression in the groundswell of support for 
Barack Obama’s presidential candidacy and the Occupy Wall Street protests of 2011, which 
brought income inequality to the forefront of U.S. discourse once again.  
To this generation the Soviet Union was either a distant, or non-existent memory. Freed 
from this burden, some dissidents turned to Marxism to explain the problems within society. 
Starting journals like Jacobin, n+1, and Dissent, these “Millennial Marxists” for the first time in 
decades readdressed the issues surrounding U.S. radicalism.194 The French Economist Thomas 
Piketty’s work on income inequality, Capital in Twenty-First Century (2013), has quickly 
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become a best seller and Alyssa Battistoni, a graduate student in political science at Yale, has 
captured attention with her calls for the merging of Marxism with the modern environmental 
movement in a piece for Jacobin entitled “Toward a Cyborg Socialism (2014).”195 
Rather than suppose that this generation will be the one to usher in socialism in the 
United States, the resurgence of radical discourse should instead be appreciated for the 
opportunity to examine modern society a little closer. Nikil Saval, an editor at n+1, attempts to 
tie the lack of U.S. socialism to emergence of the white-collar sector. In his book Cubed (2014), 
Saval claims that the post-industrial U.S. workforce has been trapped in the white-collar factories 
of “the office,” and become more isolated and alienated.196 Saval and other Millennial Marxists 
reveal the distrust and despair of this new generation toward the promises made by the U.S. 
capitalist system. But perhaps more importantly, they show us that there will never be an end of 
history. There will always be someone to imagine a different way of organizing society, and to 
wonder “why not?” 
And this reveals the true value of this exercise. It is not the answers, nor the questions, 
that are important to this inquiry, but rather, the glimpse they afford into both the mind and soul 
of the United States. These examinations tell us as much about U.S. radicalism as they do about 
the academic community that studied them. And as Sally Miller observed, “historians, creatures 
of the U.S. experience, were molded by forces in society, as was the Socialist Party. It, too, was 
shaped and formed by the attitudes of the nation.”197 Scholars are just as much a product of their 
environment, as are the radicals they study. And by tracing the evolution of the question “why is 
there no socialism in the United States?” we not only gain insight into the history of the United 
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States and radical politics, but also come to appreciate how the history of ideas and historical 
trends shape intellectual discourse and are, in turn, shaped by them. 
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